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Zero-Sum Games with "Almost" Perfect Information

Author

Listed:
  • Jean-Pierre Ponssard

    (X-DEP-ECO - Département d'Économie de l'École Polytechnique - X - École polytechnique)

Abstract

The present paper generalizes the concept of perfect information to games in which the players, while moving sequentially, remain uncertain about the actual payoff of the game because of an initial chance move. It is proved that the value of such games with "almost" perfect information can still be computed using backward induction in the game tree. The optimal behavioral strategies obtained by a dynamic procedure may, however, require randomization. A typical illustration of such games is poker.

Suggested Citation

  • Jean-Pierre Ponssard, 1975. "Zero-Sum Games with "Almost" Perfect Information," Post-Print hal-00365730, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00365730
    DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.21.7.794
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    Cited by:

    1. Marcel Dreef & Peter Borm, 2006. "On the role of chance moves and information in two-person games," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer;Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa, vol. 14(1), pages 75-98, June.
    2. Guilhem Lecouteux, 2018. "Bayesian game theorists and non-Bayesian players," The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 25(6), pages 1420-1454, November.
    3. Erik J Schlicht & Shinsuke Shimojo & Colin F Camerer & Peter Battaglia & Ken Nakayama, 2010. "Human Wagering Behavior Depends on Opponents' Faces," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 5(7), pages 1-10, July.

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