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Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information

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  • Stefano, LOVO

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    Abstract

    We de ne belief-free equilibria in two-player games with incomplete information as se- quential equilibria for which players' continuation strategies are best-replies, after every history, independently of their beliefs about the state of nature. We characterize a set of payo s that includes all belief-free equilibrium payo s. Conversely, any payo in the interior of this set is a belief-free equilibrium payo

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by HEC Paris in its series Les Cahiers de Recherche with number 884.

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    Length: 31 pages
    Date of creation: 01 Dec 2007
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:ebg:heccah:0884

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    Postal: HEC Paris, 78351 Jouy-en-Josas cedex, France
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    Related research

    Keywords: repeated game with incomplete information; Harsanyi doctrine; belief-free equilibria;

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    1. Jonathan P. Thomas & Martin Cripps, 2000. "Some Asymptotic Results in Discounted Repeated Games of One-Sided Incomplete Information," Game Theory and Information, EconWPA 0004003, EconWPA.
    2. FORGES, Françoise, 1988. "Repeated games of incomplete information: non-zero-sum," CORE Discussion Papers, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) 1988005, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    3. Ehud Kalai, 2002. "Large Robust Games," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1350, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    4. Aumann, Robert J. & Heifetz, Aviad, 2002. "Incomplete information," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, Elsevier, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 43, pages 1665-1686 Elsevier.
    5. Cremer, Jacques & McLean, Richard P, 1985. "Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist When Demands Are Interdependent," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 53(2), pages 345-61, March.
    6. Forges,F. & Minelli,E., 1995. "Property of Nash Equilibria in Repeated Games with Incomplete Information," Papers, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor. 9518, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor..
    7. Jeffrey C. Ely & Juuso Valimaki, 1999. "A Robust Folk Theorem for the Prisoner's Dilemma," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1264, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    8. Jeffrey C. Ely & Johannes Hörner & Wojciech Olszewski, 2005. "Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 73(2), pages 377-415, 03.
    9. Nimrod Megiddo, 1979. "On Repeated Games with Incomplete Information Played by Non-Bayesian Players," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 373, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    10. Jeffrey C. Ely & Juuso Valimaki, 2002. "Bad Reputation," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1348, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    11. Piccione, Michele, 2002. "The Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Imperfect Private Monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 70-83, January.
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