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Belief-free Equilibria in Games with Incomplete Information: Characterization and Existence

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Author Info
Johannes Horner () (Cowles Foundation, Yale University)
Stefano Lovo (HEC School of Management, Paris and GREGHEC)
Tristan Tomala (HEC School of Management, Paris and GREGHEC)
Abstract

We characterize belief-free equilibria in infinitely repeated games with incomplete information with N \ge 2 players and arbitrary information structures. This characterization involves a new type of individual rational constraint linking the lowest equilibrium payoffs across players. The characterization is tight: we define a set of payoffs that contains all the belief-free equilibrium payoffs; conversely, any point in the interior of this set is a belief-free equilibrium payoff vector when players are sufficiently patient. Further, we provide necessary conditions and sufficient conditions on the information structure for this set to be non-empty, both for the case of known-own payoffs, and for arbitrary payoffs.

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File URL: http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/P/cd/d17a/d1739.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Cowles Foundation, Yale University in its series Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers with number 1739.

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Length: 70 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1739

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Postal: Cowles Foundation, Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA

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Related research
Keywords: Repeated games with incomplete information; Harsanyi doctrine; Belief-free equilibria;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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This page was last updated on 2009-12-14.

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