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Nonzero-Sum Two-Person Repeated Games with Incomplete Information and Known-Own Payoffs

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  • Shalev Jonathan

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

Volume (Year): 7 (1994)
Issue (Month): 2 (September)
Pages: 246-259

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Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:7:y:1994:i:2:p:246-259

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836

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Cited by:
  1. Francoise Forges & Antoine Salomon, 2014. "Bayesian repeated games and reputation," Working Papers hal-00803919, HAL.
  2. Sorin, Sylvain, 1999. "Merging, Reputation, and Repeated Games with Incomplete Information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 29(1-2), pages 274-308, October.
  3. Lovo, Stefano & Tomala, Tristan & Hörner, Johannes, 2009. "Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence," Les Cahiers de Recherche 921, HEC Paris.
  4. Martin W. Cripps & Jonathan Thomas, 2004. "Some Asymptotic Results in Discounted Repeated Games of One-Sided Incomplete Information," ESE Discussion Papers 76, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
  5. Robson, Arthur J., 2003. "The evolution of rationality and the Red Queen," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 111(1), pages 1-22, July.
  6. Blundell,Richard & Newey,Whitney K. & Persson,Torsten (ed.), 2006. "Advances in Economics and Econometrics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521692083, October.
  7. Yuichi Yamamoto, 2013. "Individual Learning and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games," PIER Working Paper Archive 13-038, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  8. Yuichi Yamamoto, 2012. "Individual Learning and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games," PIER Working Paper Archive 12-044, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  9. Sylvain Chassang, 2010. "Building Routines: Learning, Cooperation, and the Dynamics of Incomplete Relational Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(1), pages 448-65, March.
  10. Israeli, Eitan, 1999. "Sowing Doubt Optimally in Two-Person Repeated Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 203-216, August.
  11. Cripps, M.W. & Thomas, J.P., 1992. "Reputation and commitment in two-person repeated games," Discussion Paper 1992-10, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.

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