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• Jean-François Mertens

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Paper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers with number 1995006.

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Date of creation: 01 Jan 1995
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Handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:1995006

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• Article
  • Jean-FranÚois Mertens, 1998. "The speed of convergence in repeated games with incomplete information on one side," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 27(3), pages 343-357. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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This page was last updated on 2009-12-16.