Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: Characterization and existence
AbstractWe generalize the results of Hörner and Lovo (2009)  to N-player games with arbitrary information structure. First, we characterize the set of belief-free equilibrium payoffs under low discounting as the set of feasible payoffs that are individually rational, jointly rational, and incentive compatible. Second, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions on the information structure for this set to be non-empty.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.
Volume (Year): 146 (2011)
Issue (Month): 5 (September)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869
Repeated game with incomplete information Harsanyi doctrine Belief-free equilibria;
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