3-player repeated games with lack of information on one side
AbstractWe study the existence of uniform equilibria for three-player repeated games with lack of information on one side and perfect observation. If there are only two states of nature, a completely revealing or a joint plan equilibrium always exists. This is not the case for larger spaces of states.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal International Journal of Game Theory.
Volume (Year): 30 (2001)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
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