3-player repeated games with lack of information on one side

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3-player repeated games with lack of information on one side

Author Info

Jérôme Renault () (CEREMADE, Université Paris IX Dauphine, Place du Maréchal de Lattre de Tassigny, 75775 Paris Cedex 16, France. This work has mostly been carried out at CERMSEM, Université Paris I. Final version June 2001)

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Jérôme Renault

Abstract

We study the existence of uniform equilibria for three-player repeated games with lack of information on one side and perfect observation. If there are only two states of nature, a completely revealing or a joint plan equilibrium always exists. This is not the case for larger spaces of states.

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Article provided by Springer in its journal International Journal of Game Theory.

Volume (Year): 30 (2001)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 221-245
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Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:30:y:2001:i:2:p:221-245

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