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Information about:
Jérôme Renault

Personal Details | Affiliation | Works
This is information that was supplied by Jérôme Renault in registering through RePEc. If you are Jérôme Renault , you may change this information at RePEc. Or if you are not registered and would like to be listed as well, register at RePEc. When you register or update your RePEc registration, you may identify the papers and articles you have authored.

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Personal Details

First Name: Jérôme
Middle Name:
Last Name: Renault
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RePEc Short-ID: pre203

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Homepage: http://sites.google.com/site/jrenaultsite/
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Affiliation

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Works

| Working papers | Articles | Access and download statistics | Citations (if any)| NEP Fields |
Download all references for this author: available formats: HTML (with abstracts), plain text (with abstracts), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF

Working papers

  1. Jerome Renault & Sergio Scarlatti & Marco Scarsini, 2003. "A folk theorem for minority games," ICER Working Papers - Applied Mathematics Series 10-2003, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    Published as:

  2. Renault, J., 1997. "Strategic Transmission of Information: A Chracterization," Papiers d'Economie Mathématique et Applications 97.79, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1).

  3. Renault, J. & Tomala, T., 1997. "Repeated Proximity Games," Papiers d'Economie Mathématique et Applications 97.14, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1).

  4. Renault, J., 1997. "On Repeated Games with Incomplete Information and Signals," Papiers d'Economie Mathématique et Applications 97.72, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1).

Articles

  1. Renault, Jérôme & Scarsini, Marco & Tomala, Tristan, 2008. "Playing off-line games with bounded rationality," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 207-223, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

  2. Renault, Jérôme & Scarlatti, Sergio & Scarsini, Marco, 2008. "Discounted and finitely repeated minority games with public signals," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 44-74, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

  3. Renault, Jerome & Scarlatti, Sergio & Scarsini, Marco, 2005. "A folk theorem for minority games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 208-230, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:

  4. Renault, Jerome & Tomala, Tristan, 2004. "Learning the state of nature in repeated games with incomplete information and signals," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 124-156, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

  5. Renault, Jerome & Tomala, Tristan, 2004. "Communication equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with imperfect monitoring," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 313-344, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

  6. Jérôme Renault, 2001. "3-player repeated games with lack of information on one side," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 30(2), pages 221-245. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Did you know? The most prolific authors have over 700 items listed on IDEAS.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-15.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.