IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/f/pre203.html
   My authors  Follow this author

Jérôme Renault
(Jerome Renault)

Personal Details

First Name:Jerome
Middle Name:
Last Name:Renault
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pre203
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
http://sites.google.com/site/jrenaultsite/

Affiliation

Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Toulouse, France
http://www.tse-fr.eu/
RePEc:edi:tsetofr (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Hörner, Johannes & Renault, Jérôme, 2023. "A folk theorem for finitely repeated games with public monitoring," TSE Working Papers 23-1473, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
  2. Fabien Gensbittel & Marcin Peski & Jérôme Renault, 2022. "Value-Based Distance Between Information Structures," Post-Print hal-01869139, HAL.
  3. Frédéric Koessler & Marie Laclau & Jérôme Renault & Tristan Tomala, 2022. "Long Information Design," Post-Print halshs-02400053, HAL.
  4. Crampes, Claude & Renault, Jérôme, 2022. "Supply Flexibility and risk transfer in electricity markets," TSE Working Papers 22-1350, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Sep 2023.
  5. Frédéric Koessler & Marie Laclau & Jérôme Renault & Tristan Tomala, 2022. "Splitting games over finite sets," Post-Print halshs-03672222, HAL.
  6. Françoise Forges & Jérôme Renault, 2021. "Strategic information transmission with sender's approval," Post-Print hal-02440627, HAL.
  7. Crampes, Claude & Renault, Jérôme, 2021. "Imperfect competition in electricity markets with partially flexible technologies," TSE Working Papers 21-1198, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
  8. R. Buckdahn & Jin Li & Marc Quincampoix & Jérôme Renault, 2020. "Representation formulas for limit values of long run stochastic optimal controls," Post-Print hal-02929156, HAL.
  9. Fabien Gensbittel & Marcin Peski & Jérôme Renault, 2019. "The Large Space Of Information Structures," Working Papers hal-02075905, HAL.
  10. Crampes, Claude & Renault, Jérôme, 2018. "Supply flexibility in electricity markets," TSE Working Papers 18-964, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
  11. Laraki, Rida & Renault, Jérôme, 2017. "Acyclic Gambling Games," TSE Working Papers 17-768, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
  12. Renault, Jérôme & Venel, Xavier, 2017. "A distance for probability spaces, and long-term values in Markov Decision Processes and Repeated Games," TSE Working Papers 17-748, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
  13. Renault, Jérôme & Solan, Eilon & Vieille, Nicolas, 2017. "Optimal Dynamic Information Provision," TSE Working Papers 17-749, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
  14. Renault, Jérôme & Ziliotto, Bruno, 2017. "Hidden Stochastic Games and Limit Equilibrium Payoffs," TSE Working Papers 17-750, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
  15. Gensbittel, Fabien & Lovo, Stefano & Renault, Jérôme & Tomala, Tristan, 2017. "Zero-Sum Revision Games," TSE Working Papers 17-751, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
  16. Jérôme Renault & Xavier Venel, 2017. "Long-term values in Markov Decision Processes and Repeated Games, and a new distance for probability spaces," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-01396680, HAL.
  17. Hugo Gimbert & Jérôme Renault & Sylvain Sorin & Xavier Venel & Wieslaw Zielonka, 2016. "On the values of repeated games with signals," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-01006951, HAL.
  18. Joyee Deb & Julio González Díaz & Jérôme Renault, 2013. "Uniform Folk Theorems in Repeated Anonymous Random Matching Games," Working Papers 13-16, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
  19. Renault, Jerome & Solan, Eilon & Vieille, Nicolas, 2012. "Dynamic Sender-Receiver Games," HEC Research Papers Series 966, HEC Paris.
  20. Marco Scarsini & Sergio Scarlatti & Jérôme Renault, 2008. "Discounted and finitely repeated minority games with public signals," Post-Print hal-00365583, HAL.
  21. Tristan Tomala & Jerome Renault & Marco Scarsini, 2007. "A Minority Game with Bounded Recall," Post-Print hal-00538967, HAL.
  22. Jérôme Renault & Tristan Tomala, 2005. "Reliability and security of multicast communication in general networks," Working Papers hal-00584697, HAL.
  23. Jerome Renault & Sergio Scarlatti & Marco Scarsini, 2003. "A folk theorem for minority games," ICER Working Papers - Applied Mathematics Series 10-2003, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research.
  24. Renault, J., 1997. "On Repeated Games with Incomplete Information and Signals," Papiers d'Economie Mathématique et Applications 97.72, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1).
  25. Renault, J., 1997. "Strategic Transmission of Information: A Chracterization," Papiers d'Economie Mathématique et Applications 97.79, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1).
  26. Renault, J. & Tomala, T., 1997. "Repeated Proximity Games," Papiers d'Economie Mathématique et Applications 97.14, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1).

    repec:hal:pseptp:halshs-03342880 is not listed on IDEAS
    repec:hal:psewpa:halshs-02400053 is not listed on IDEAS
    repec:hal:wpaper:halshs-02400053 is not listed on IDEAS
    repec:hal:wpaper:hal-01869139 is not listed on IDEAS
    repec:hal:journl:halshs-03342880 is not listed on IDEAS

Articles

  1. Koessler, Frederic & Laclau, Marie & Renault, Jérôme & Tomala, Tristan, 2022. "Long information design," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 17(2), May.
  2. Gensbittel, Fabien & Pęski, Marcin & Renault, Jérôme, 2022. "Value-based distance between information structures," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 17(3), July.
  3. Françoise Forges & Jérôme Renault, 2021. "Strategic information transmission with sender’s approval," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 50(2), pages 475-502, June.
  4. Jérôme Renault & Bruno Ziliotto, 2020. "Limit Equilibrium Payoffs in Stochastic Games," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 45(3), pages 889-895, August.
  5. Renault, Jérôme & Ziliotto, Bruno, 2020. "Hidden stochastic games and limit equilibrium payoffs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 122-139.
  6. Crampes, Claude & Renault, Jérôme, 2019. "How many markets for wholesale electricity when supply ispartially flexible?," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 465-478.
  7. Gensbittel, Fabien & Lovo, Stefano & Renault, Jérôme & Tomala, Tristan, 2018. "Zero-sum revision games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 504-522.
  8. Jérôme Renault & Xavier Venel, 2017. "Long-Term Values in Markov Decision Processes and Repeated Games, and a New Distance for Probability Spaces," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 42(2), pages 349-376, May.
  9. Renault, Jérôme & Solan, Eilon & Vieille, Nicolas, 2017. "Optimal dynamic information provision," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 329-349.
  10. Deb, Joyee & González-Díaz, Julio & Renault, Jérôme, 2016. "Uniform folk theorems in repeated anonymous random matching games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 1-23.
  11. Claude Crampes & Jérôme Renault, 2016. "The Repairman Problem Revisited," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 121-122, pages 7-24.
  12. Renault, Jérôme & Renou, Ludovic & Tomala, Tristan, 2014. "Secure message transmission on directed networks," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 1-18.
  13. Renault, Jérôme & Solan, Eilon & Vieille, Nicolas, 2013. "Dynamic sender–receiver games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(2), pages 502-534.
  14. Jérôme Renault & Tristan Tomala, 2011. "General Properties of Long-Run Supergames," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 319-350, June.
  15. Renault, Jérôme & Scarsini, Marco & Tomala, Tristan, 2008. "Playing off-line games with bounded rationality," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 207-223, September.
  16. Renault, Jérôme & Scarlatti, Sergio & Scarsini, Marco, 2008. "Discounted and finitely repeated minority games with public signals," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 44-74, July.
  17. Renault, Jerome & Scarlatti, Sergio & Scarsini, Marco, 2005. "A folk theorem for minority games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 208-230, November.
  18. Renault, Jerome & Tomala, Tristan, 2004. "Learning the state of nature in repeated games with incomplete information and signals," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 124-156, April.
  19. Renault, Jerome & Tomala, Tristan, 2004. "Communication equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with imperfect monitoring," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 313-344, November.
  20. Jérôme Renault, 2001. "3-player repeated games with lack of information on one side," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 30(2), pages 221-245.
  21. JÊrÆme Renault & Tristan Tomala, 1998. "Repeated proximity games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 27(4), pages 539-559.

    RePEc:inm:ormoor:v:31:y:2006:i:3:p:490-512 is not listed on IDEAS
    RePEc:inm:ormoor:v:37:y:2012:i:1:p:154-179 is not listed on IDEAS
    RePEc:inm:ormoor:v:32:y:2007:i:4:p:873-889 is not listed on IDEAS
    RePEc:inm:ormoor:v:45:y:2020:i:4:p:1237-1257 is not listed on IDEAS
    RePEc:inm:ormoor:v:25:y:2000:i:4:p:552-572 is not listed on IDEAS
    RePEc:inm:ormoor:v:40:y:2015:i:4:p:820-841 is not listed on IDEAS
    RePEc:inm:ormoor:v:26:y:2001:i:4:p:832-850 is not listed on IDEAS

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Françoise Forges & Jérôme Renault, 2021. "Strategic information transmission with sender's approval," Post-Print hal-02440627, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Sémirat, Stéphan & Forges, Françoise, 2022. "Strategic information transmission with sender's approval: The single-crossing case," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 242-263.

  2. Fabien Gensbittel & Marcin Peski & Jérôme Renault, 2019. "The Large Space Of Information Structures," Working Papers hal-02075905, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Olivier GOSSNER & Jean-François MERTENS, 2020. "The Value of Information in Zero-Sum Games," Working Papers 2020-19, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.

  3. Laraki, Rida & Renault, Jérôme, 2017. "Acyclic Gambling Games," TSE Working Papers 17-768, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).

    Cited by:

  4. Renault, Jérôme & Venel, Xavier, 2017. "A distance for probability spaces, and long-term values in Markov Decision Processes and Repeated Games," TSE Working Papers 17-748, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).

    Cited by:

    1. Gensbittel, Fabien & Renault, Jérôme & Peski, Marcin, 2019. "The large space of information structures," TSE Working Papers 19-1006, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    2. Laraki, Rida & Renault, Jérôme, 2017. "Acyclic Gambling Games," TSE Working Papers 17-768, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    3. R. Buckdahn & Jin Li & Marc Quincampoix & Jérôme Renault, 2020. "Representation formulas for limit values of long run stochastic optimal controls," Post-Print hal-02929156, HAL.
    4. Xavier Venel & Bruno Ziliotto, 2016. "Strong Uniform Value in Gambling Houses and Partially Observable Markov Decision Processes," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-01395429, HAL.
    5. Koessler, Frederic & Laclau, Marie & Renault, Jérôme & Tomala, Tristan, 2022. "Long information design," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 17(2), May.
    6. Xavier Venel & Bruno Ziliotto, 2016. "Strong Uniform Value in Gambling Houses and Partially Observable Markov Decision Processes," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) hal-01395429, HAL.
    7. Xavier Venel & Bruno Ziliotto, 2016. "Pathwise uniform value in gambling houses and Partially Observable Markov Decision Processes," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-01302567, HAL.
    8. Xavier Venel & Bruno Ziliotto, 2016. "Pathwise uniform value in gambling houses and Partially Observable Markov Decision Processes," Working Papers hal-01302567, HAL.
    9. Xavier Venel & Bruno Ziliotto, 2016. "Strong Uniform Value in Gambling Houses and Partially Observable Markov Decision Processes," Post-Print hal-01395429, HAL.
    10. Bruno Ziliotto, 2016. "General limit value in zero-sum stochastic games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 45(1), pages 353-374, March.

  5. Renault, Jérôme & Solan, Eilon & Vieille, Nicolas, 2017. "Optimal Dynamic Information Provision," TSE Working Papers 17-749, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).

    Cited by:

    1. Xu, Hedong & Tian, Cunzhi & Ye, Wenxing & Fan, Suohai, 2018. "Effects of investors’ power correlations in the power-based game on networks," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 506(C), pages 424-432.
    2. Wang, Jun & Qin, Yanjun & Zhou, Jingyang, 2021. "Incentive policies for prefabrication implementation of real estate enterprises: An evolutionary game theory-based analysis," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 156(C).
    3. Miltiadis Makris & Ludovic Renou, 2018. "Information design in multi-stage games," Working Papers 861, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
    4. Caio Lorecchio, 2022. "Persuading crowds," UB School of Economics Working Papers 2022/434, University of Barcelona School of Economics.
    5. Wei Zhao & Claudio Mezzetti & Ludovic Renou & Tristan Tomala, 2020. "Contracting over persistent information," Papers 2007.05983, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2021.
    6. Ashkenazi-Golan, Galit & Rainer, Catherine & Solan, Eilon, 2020. "Solving two-state Markov games with incomplete information on one side," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 122(C), pages 83-104.
    7. Aradhye, Aditya & Flesch, János & Staudigl, Mathias & Vermeulen, Dries, 2023. "Incentive compatibility in sender-receiver stopping games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 303-320.
    8. Xu, Hedong & Tian, Cunzhi & Xiao, Xinrong & Fan, Suohai, 2018. "Evolutionary investors’ power-based game on networks," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 330(C), pages 125-133.
    9. Ehud Lehrer & Dimitry Shaiderman, 2022. "Markovian Persuasion with Stochastic Revelations," Papers 2204.08659, arXiv.org, revised May 2022.
    10. Xu, Hedong & Fan, Suohai & Tian, Cunzhi & Xiao, Xinrong, 2019. "Evolutionary investor sharing game on networks," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 340(C), pages 138-145.
    11. Matteo Escud'e & Ludvig Sinander, 2019. "Slow persuasion," Papers 1903.09055, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2022.
    12. Koessler, Frederic & Laclau, Marie & Renault, Jérôme & Tomala, Tristan, 2022. "Long information design," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 17(2), May.
    13. Jibang Wu & Zixuan Zhang & Zhe Feng & Zhaoran Wang & Zhuoran Yang & Michael I. Jordan & Haifeng Xu, 2022. "Sequential Information Design: Markov Persuasion Process and Its Efficient Reinforcement Learning," Papers 2202.10678, arXiv.org.
    14. Ehud Lehrer & Dimitry Shaiderman, 2021. "Markovian Persuasion," Papers 2111.14365, arXiv.org.
    15. Babichenko, Yakov & Talgam-Cohen, Inbal & Xu, Haifeng & Zabarnyi, Konstantin, 2022. "Regret-minimizing Bayesian persuasion," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 226-248.
    16. Shota Ichihashi, 2022. "Dynamic Privacy Choices," Staff Working Papers 22-8, Bank of Canada.
    17. Johannes Hörner & Nicolas S Lambert, 2021. "Motivational Ratings [Toward the Next Generation of Recommender Systems: A Survey of the State-of-the-Art and Possible Extensions]," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 88(4), pages 1892-1935.
    18. Herbert Sylvérie, 2022. "State-dependent Central Bank Communication with Heterogeneous Beliefs," Working papers 875, Banque de France.
    19. Parakhonyak, Alexei & Vikander, Nick, 2023. "Information design through scarcity and social learning," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 207(C).
    20. Aleksei Smirnov & Egor Starkov, 2022. "Bad News Turned Good: Reversal under Censorship," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 14(2), pages 506-560, May.
    21. Saed Alizamir & Francis de Véricourt & Shouqiang Wang, 2020. "Warning Against Recurring Risks: An Information Design Approach," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(10), pages 4612-4629, October.
    22. Ashkenazi-Golan, Galit & Hernández, Penélope & Neeman, Zvika & Solan, Eilon, 2023. "Markovian persuasion with two states," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 119970, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    23. Deepanshu Vasal, 2020. "Dynamic information design," Papers 2005.07267, arXiv.org.
    24. Hahn, Niklas & Hoefer, Martin & Smorodinsky, Rann, 2022. "The secretary recommendation problem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 199-228.
    25. Can Küçükgül & Özalp Özer & Shouqiang Wang, 2022. "Engineering Social Learning: Information Design of Time-Locked Sales Campaigns for Online Platforms," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(7), pages 4899-4918, July.
    26. Farzaneh Farhadi & Demosthenis Teneketzis, 2022. "Dynamic Information Design: A Simple Problem on Optimal Sequential Information Disclosure," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 12(2), pages 443-484, June.
    27. Maxim Senkov, 2022. "Setting Interim Deadlines to Persuade," Papers 2210.08294, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2023.

  6. Renault, Jérôme & Ziliotto, Bruno, 2017. "Hidden Stochastic Games and Limit Equilibrium Payoffs," TSE Working Papers 17-750, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).

    Cited by:

    1. Venel, Xavier, 2021. "Regularity of dynamic opinion games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 126(C), pages 305-334.

  7. Gensbittel, Fabien & Lovo, Stefano & Renault, Jérôme & Tomala, Tristan, 2017. "Zero-Sum Revision Games," TSE Working Papers 17-751, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).

    Cited by:

    1. Sofia Moroni, 2019. "Existence of trembling hand perfect and sequential equilibrium in games with stochastic timing of moves," Working Paper 6757, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh.
    2. Zhuohan Wang & Dong Hao, 2022. "Characterizing Agent Behavior in Revision Games with Uncertain Deadline," Games, MDPI, vol. 13(6), pages 1-13, November.
    3. Yevgeny Tsodikovich, 2021. "The worst-case payoff in games with stochastic revision opportunities," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 300(1), pages 205-224, May.
    4. Dong Hao & Qi Shi & Jinyan Su & Bo An, 2021. "Cooperation, Retaliation and Forgiveness in Revision Games," Papers 2112.02271, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2022.
    5. Pierre Bernhard & Marc Deschamps, 2021. "Dynamic Equilibrium with Randomly Arriving Players," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 11(2), pages 242-269, June.
    6. Roy, Nilanjan, 2023. "Fostering collusion through action revision in duopolies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 208(C).
    7. Sofia Moroni, 2020. "Existence of Trembling hand perfect and sequential equilibrium in Stochastic Games," Working Paper 6837, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh.

  8. Jérôme Renault & Xavier Venel, 2017. "Long-term values in Markov Decision Processes and Repeated Games, and a new distance for probability spaces," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-01396680, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Gensbittel, Fabien & Renault, Jérôme & Peski, Marcin, 2019. "The large space of information structures," TSE Working Papers 19-1006, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    2. R. Buckdahn & Jin Li & Marc Quincampoix & Jérôme Renault, 2020. "Representation formulas for limit values of long run stochastic optimal controls," Post-Print hal-02929156, HAL.
    3. Koessler, Frederic & Laclau, Marie & Renault, Jérôme & Tomala, Tristan, 2022. "Long information design," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 17(2), May.

  9. Hugo Gimbert & Jérôme Renault & Sylvain Sorin & Xavier Venel & Wieslaw Zielonka, 2016. "On the values of repeated games with signals," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-01006951, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Daniel Hernández-Hernández & Joshué H. Ricalde-Guerrero, 2022. "Zero-Sum Stochastic Games with Random Rules of Priority, Discrete Linear-Quadratic Model," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 12(4), pages 1293-1311, December.
    2. Renault, Jérôme & Ziliotto, Bruno, 2020. "Hidden stochastic games and limit equilibrium payoffs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 122-139.

  10. Joyee Deb & Julio González Díaz & Jérôme Renault, 2013. "Uniform Folk Theorems in Repeated Anonymous Random Matching Games," Working Papers 13-16, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. Heng Liu, 2017. "Correlation and unmediated cheap talk in repeated games with imperfect monitoring," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(4), pages 1037-1069, November.
    2. Fritz, Qi Gao, 2023. "Label to match - Firms’ signaling decisions when not everyone cares," SocArXiv ay8rq, Center for Open Science.
    3. Joyee Deb & Takuo Sugaya & Alexander Wolitzky, 2020. "The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games With Anonymous Random Matching," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 88(3), pages 917-964, May.

  11. Renault, Jerome & Solan, Eilon & Vieille, Nicolas, 2012. "Dynamic Sender-Receiver Games," HEC Research Papers Series 966, HEC Paris.

    Cited by:

    1. Alex Bloedel & R. Vijay Krishna & Oksana Leukhina, 2018. "Insurance and Inequality with Persistent Private Information," Working Papers 2018-020, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, revised 12 Dec 2021.
    2. Mikhail Golosov, 2009. "Dynamic Strategic Information Transmission," 2009 Meeting Papers 181, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    3. Aradhye, Aditya & Flesch, János & Staudigl, Mathias & Vermeulen, Dries, 2023. "Incentive compatibility in sender-receiver stopping games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 303-320.
    4. Kuvalekar, Aditya & Lipnowski, Elliot & Ramos, João, 2022. "Goodwill in communication," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 203(C).
    5. Renou , Ludovic & Tomala, Tristan, 2013. "Approximate Implementation in Markovian Environments," HEC Research Papers Series 1015, HEC Paris.
    6. Arnold Polanski & Mark Quement, 2023. "The battle of opinion: dynamic information revelation by ideological senders," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 52(2), pages 463-483, June.
    7. Schottmüller, Christoph, 2019. "Too good to be truthful: Why competent advisers are fired," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 181(C), pages 333-360.
    8. Margaria, Chiara & Smolin, Alex, 2018. "Dynamic communication with biased senders," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 330-339.
    9. Juan F. Escobar & Gastón Llanes, 2015. "Cooperation Dynamic in Repeated Games of Adverse Selection," Documentos de Trabajo 311, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
    10. Feddersen, Timothy & Gradwohl, Ronen, 2020. "Decentralized advice," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
    11. Harry Pei, 2020. "Repeated Communication with Private Lying Cost," Papers 2006.08069, arXiv.org.
    12. Atakan, Alp & Koçkesen, Levent & Kubilay, Elif, 2020. "Starting small to communicate," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 265-296.
    13. Renault, Jérôme & Solan, Eilon & Vieille, Nicolas, 2017. "Optimal dynamic information provision," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 329-349.
    14. Chen, Yi, 2022. "Dynamic delegation with a persistent state," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 17(4), November.
    15. James Best & Daniel Quigley, 2016. "Persuasion for the Long-Run," Economics Papers 2016-W12, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
    16. Pei, Harry, 2023. "Repeated communication with private lying costs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 210(C).
    17. Zeinab Aboutalebi & Ayush Pant, 2021. "Believe ... and you are there. On Self-Confidence and Feedback," Working Papers 64, Ashoka University, Department of Economics.
    18. Grillo, Edoardo, 2016. "The hidden cost of raising voters’ expectations: Reference dependence and politicians’ credibility," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 126-143.
    19. ,, 2015. "Unraveling in a repeated moral hazard model with multiple agents," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(1), January.
    20. Meng, Delong, 2021. "On the value of repetition for communication games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 127(C), pages 227-246.

  12. Marco Scarsini & Sergio Scarlatti & Jérôme Renault, 2008. "Discounted and finitely repeated minority games with public signals," Post-Print hal-00365583, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Contou-Carrère, Pauline & Tomala, Tristan, 2011. "Finitely repeated games with semi-standard monitoring," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 14-21, January.
    2. Pauline Contou-Carrère & Tristan Tomala, 2010. "Finitely repeated games with semi-standard monitoring," Post-Print halshs-00524134, HAL.
    3. Jérôme Renault & Tristan Tomala, 2011. "General Properties of Long-Run Supergames," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 319-350, June.
    4. Cingiz, Kutay & Flesch, Janos & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Predtetchinski, Arkadi, 2016. "Perfect Information Games where Each Player Acts Only Once," Research Memorandum 036, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).

  13. Tristan Tomala & Jerome Renault & Marco Scarsini, 2007. "A Minority Game with Bounded Recall," Post-Print hal-00538967, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Bavly, Gilad & Peretz, Ron, 2019. "Limits of correlation in repeated games with bounded memory," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 131-145.
    2. George J. Mailath & Wojciech Olszewski, 2008. "Folk Theorems with Bounded Recall under (Almost) Perfect Monitoring," PIER Working Paper Archive 08-019, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    3. Cingiz, Kutay & Flesch, Janos & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Predtetchinski, Arkadi, 2016. "Perfect Information Games where Each Player Acts Only Once," Research Memorandum 036, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
    4. Doraszelski, Ulrich & Escobar, Juan F., 2012. "Restricted feedback in long term relationships," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(1), pages 142-161.
    5. Renault, Jérôme & Scarsini, Marco & Tomala, Tristan, 2008. "Playing off-line games with bounded rationality," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 207-223, September.

  14. Jerome Renault & Sergio Scarlatti & Marco Scarsini, 2003. "A folk theorem for minority games," ICER Working Papers - Applied Mathematics Series 10-2003, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research.

    Cited by:

    1. Marco Scarsini & A. Müller & Taizhong Hu, 2004. "Some counterexamples in positive dependence," Post-Print hal-00539628, HAL.
    2. Thibault Gadjos & Eric Maurin, 2002. "Unequal Uncertainties and Uncertain Inequalities : An Axiomatic Approach," Working Papers 2002-32, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
    3. Willemien Kets, 2007. "The minority game: An economics perspective," Papers 0706.4432, arXiv.org.
    4. Renault, Jerome & Scarlatti, Sergio & Scarsini, Marco, 2005. "A folk theorem for minority games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 208-230, November.
    5. Thibault Gadjos & Jean-Marc Tallon & Jean-Christophe Vergnaud, 2002. "Decision Making with Imprecise Probabilistic Information," Working Papers 2002-33, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
    6. Kets, W. & Voorneveld, M., 2007. "Congestion, Equilibrium and Learning : The Minority Game," Other publications TiSEM 49539a1f-2921-4dd9-83a0-4, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    7. Kets, W., 2008. "Networks and learning in game theory," Other publications TiSEM 7713fce1-3131-498c-8c6f-3, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    8. Jérôme Renault & Tristan Tomala, 2011. "General Properties of Long-Run Supergames," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 319-350, June.
    9. Iván Arribas & Amparo Urbano Salvador, 2014. "Local coordination and global congestion in random networks," Discussion Papers in Economic Behaviour 0814, University of Valencia, ERI-CES.
    10. Müller, Alfred & Scarsini, Marco, 2005. "Archimedean copulæ and positive dependence," Journal of Multivariate Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 93(2), pages 434-445, April.
    11. Antonio Lijoi & Igor Prünster & Stephen G. Walker, 2004. "On consistency of nonparametric normal mixtures for Bayesian density estimation," ICER Working Papers - Applied Mathematics Series 23-2004, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research.
    12. Marco Scarsini & Sergio Scarlatti & Jérôme Renault, 2008. "Discounted and finitely repeated minority games with public signals," Post-Print hal-00365583, HAL.
    13. Antonio Lijoi & Igor Prünster & Stephen G. Walker, 2004. "On rates of convergence for posterior distributions in infinite–dimensional models," ICER Working Papers - Applied Mathematics Series 24-2004, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research.
    14. Sonnemans, J. & Tuinstra, J. & Linde, J., 2013. "Strategies and Evolution in the Minority Game: A Multi- Round Strategy Experiment," CeNDEF Working Papers 13-02, Universiteit van Amsterdam, Center for Nonlinear Dynamics in Economics and Finance.
    15. Antonio Lijoi & Igor Prünster & Stephen G. Walker, 2004. "Contributions to the understanding of Bayesian consistency," ICER Working Papers - Applied Mathematics Series 13-2004, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research.
    16. Ted Theodosopoulos & Ming Yuen, 2006. "Imbalance attractors for a strategic model of market microstructure," Papers math/0605421, arXiv.org.

  15. Renault, J., 1997. "On Repeated Games with Incomplete Information and Signals," Papiers d'Economie Mathématique et Applications 97.72, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1).

    Cited by:

    1. Simon, Robert Samuel, 2002. "Separation of joint plan equilibrium payoffs from the min-max functions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 79-102, October.

  16. Renault, J. & Tomala, T., 1997. "Repeated Proximity Games," Papiers d'Economie Mathématique et Applications 97.14, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1).

    Cited by:

    1. Deb, Joyee & González-Díaz, Julio & Renault, Jérôme, 2016. "Uniform folk theorems in repeated anonymous random matching games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 1-23.
    2. Tomala, Tristan, 2009. "Perfect communication equilibria in repeated games with imperfect monitoring," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 682-694, November.
    3. Olivier Gossner & Rida Laraki & Tristan Tomala, 2004. "Maxmin computation and optimal correlation in repeated games with signals," Working Papers hal-00242940, HAL.
    4. Marie Laclau & Ludovic Renou & Xavier Venel, 2020. "Robust communication on networks," Papers 2007.00457, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2020.
    5. Markus Kinateder, 2006. "Repeated Games Played in a Network," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 674.06, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    6. Marie Laclau, 2014. "Communication in repeated network games with imperfect monitoring," PSE - Labex "OSE-Ouvrir la Science Economique" halshs-01109156, HAL.
    7. Renault, Jerome & Tomala, Tristan, 2004. "Communication equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with imperfect monitoring," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 313-344, November.
    8. Renault, Jérôme & Renou, Ludovic & Tomala, Tristan, 2014. "Secure message transmission on directed networks," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 1-18.
    9. Laclau, Marie, 2012. "A folk theorem for repeated games played on a network," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 711-737.
    10. Jérôme Renault & Tristan Tomala, 2011. "General Properties of Long-Run Supergames," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 319-350, June.
    11. Tristan Tomala, 2011. "Fault Reporting in Partially Known Networks and Folk Theorems," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 59(3), pages 754-763, June.
    12. Nava, Francesco & Piccione, Michele, 2012. "Efficiency in repeated games with local interaction and uncertain local monitoring," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 54250, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    13. Marie Laclau, 2016. "Repeated games with local monitoring and private communication," PSE Working Papers hal-01285070, HAL.
    14. Fainmesser, Itay P. & Goldberg, David A., 2018. "Cooperation in partly observable networked markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 220-237.
    15. King, Maia, 2020. "The probabilities of node-to-node diffusion in fixed networks," SocArXiv dfq8y, Center for Open Science.
    16. , & ,, 2014. "Efficiency in repeated games with local interaction and uncertain local monitoring," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 9(1), January.
    17. Renault, Jerome & Tomala, Tristan, 2004. "Learning the state of nature in repeated games with incomplete information and signals," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 124-156, April.
    18. Yair Goldberg, 2003. "On the Minmax of Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring: A Computational Example," Discussion Paper Series dp345, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    19. Marie Laclau & Ludovic Renou & Xavier Venel, 2024. "Communication on networks and strong reliability," Working Papers hal-03099678, HAL.

Articles

  1. Françoise Forges & Jérôme Renault, 2021. "Strategic information transmission with sender’s approval," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 50(2), pages 475-502, June.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  2. Jérôme Renault & Bruno Ziliotto, 2020. "Limit Equilibrium Payoffs in Stochastic Games," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 45(3), pages 889-895, August.

    Cited by:

    1. Renault, Jérôme & Ziliotto, Bruno, 2020. "Hidden stochastic games and limit equilibrium payoffs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 122-139.
    2. Venel, Xavier, 2021. "Regularity of dynamic opinion games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 126(C), pages 305-334.

  3. Renault, Jérôme & Ziliotto, Bruno, 2020. "Hidden stochastic games and limit equilibrium payoffs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 122-139.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  4. Crampes, Claude & Renault, Jérôme, 2019. "How many markets for wholesale electricity when supply ispartially flexible?," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 465-478.

    Cited by:

    1. Klaus Eisenack & Mathias Mier, 2019. "Peak-load pricing with different types of dispatchability," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 56(2), pages 105-124, December.
    2. Sirin, Selahattin Murat & Camadan, Ercument & Erten, Ibrahim Etem & Zhang, Alex Hongliang, 2023. "Market failure or politics? Understanding the motives behind regulatory actions to address surging electricity prices," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 180(C).
    3. Mier, Mathias, 2021. "Efficient pricing of electricity revisited," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 104(C).
    4. Crampes, Claude & Renault, Jérôme, 2021. "Imperfect competition in electricity markets with partially flexible technologies," TSE Working Papers 21-1198, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    5. Crampes, Claude & Renault, Jérôme, 2022. "Supply Flexibility and risk transfer in electricity markets," TSE Working Papers 22-1350, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Sep 2023.

  5. Gensbittel, Fabien & Lovo, Stefano & Renault, Jérôme & Tomala, Tristan, 2018. "Zero-sum revision games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 504-522.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  6. Jérôme Renault & Xavier Venel, 2017. "Long-Term Values in Markov Decision Processes and Repeated Games, and a New Distance for Probability Spaces," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 42(2), pages 349-376, May.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  7. Renault, Jérôme & Solan, Eilon & Vieille, Nicolas, 2017. "Optimal dynamic information provision," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 329-349.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  8. Deb, Joyee & González-Díaz, Julio & Renault, Jérôme, 2016. "Uniform folk theorems in repeated anonymous random matching games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 1-23.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  9. Renault, Jérôme & Renou, Ludovic & Tomala, Tristan, 2014. "Secure message transmission on directed networks," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 1-18.

    Cited by:

    1. Marie Laclau & Ludovic Renou & Xavier Venel, 2020. "Robust communication on networks," Papers 2007.00457, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2020.
    2. Rivera, Thomas J., 2018. "Incentives and the structure of communication," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 201-247.
    3. Daniil Larionov & Hien Pham & Takuro Yamashita & Shuguang Zhu, 2022. "First Best Implementation With Costly Information Acquisition," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2022_377, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
    4. Zhu, Shuguang, 2023. "Private disclosure with multiple agents," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 212(C).
    5. Marie Laclau & Ludovic Renou & Xavier Venel, 2024. "Communication on networks and strong reliability," Working Papers hal-03099678, HAL.

  10. Renault, Jérôme & Solan, Eilon & Vieille, Nicolas, 2013. "Dynamic sender–receiver games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(2), pages 502-534.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  11. Jérôme Renault & Tristan Tomala, 2011. "General Properties of Long-Run Supergames," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 319-350, June.

    Cited by:

    1. Deb, Joyee & González-Díaz, Julio & Renault, Jérôme, 2016. "Uniform folk theorems in repeated anonymous random matching games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 1-23.
    2. Heng Liu, 2017. "Correlation and unmediated cheap talk in repeated games with imperfect monitoring," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(4), pages 1037-1069, November.
    3. Jérôme Renault & Bruno Ziliotto, 2020. "Limit Equilibrium Payoffs in Stochastic Games," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 45(3), pages 889-895, August.

  12. Renault, Jérôme & Scarsini, Marco & Tomala, Tristan, 2008. "Playing off-line games with bounded rationality," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 207-223, September.

    Cited by:

    1. Peretz, Ron, 2012. "The strategic value of recall," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 332-351.

  13. Renault, Jérôme & Scarlatti, Sergio & Scarsini, Marco, 2008. "Discounted and finitely repeated minority games with public signals," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 44-74, July.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  14. Renault, Jerome & Scarlatti, Sergio & Scarsini, Marco, 2005. "A folk theorem for minority games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 208-230, November.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  15. Renault, Jerome & Tomala, Tristan, 2004. "Learning the state of nature in repeated games with incomplete information and signals," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 124-156, April.

    Cited by:

    1. Stefano Lovo & Johannes Hörner & Tristan Tomala, 2011. "Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence," Post-Print hal-00630299, HAL.
    2. Marie Laclau & Ludovic Renou & Xavier Venel, 2020. "Robust communication on networks," Papers 2007.00457, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2020.
    3. Laclau, Marie, 2012. "A folk theorem for repeated games played on a network," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 711-737.
    4. Fudenberg, Drew & Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2011. "Learning from Private Information in Noisy Repeated Games," Scholarly Articles 9962008, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    5. Marie Laclau, 2016. "Repeated games with local monitoring and private communication," PSE Working Papers hal-01285070, HAL.
    6. Marie Laclau & Ludovic Renou & Xavier Venel, 2024. "Communication on networks and strong reliability," Working Papers hal-03099678, HAL.

  16. Renault, Jerome & Tomala, Tristan, 2004. "Communication equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with imperfect monitoring," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 313-344, November.

    Cited by:

    1. Nicolas Jacquemet & Frédéric Koessler, 2013. "Using or Hiding Private Information? An Experimental Study of Zero-Sum Repeated Games with Incomplete Information," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-00773412, HAL.
    2. Tomala, Tristan, 2009. "Perfect communication equilibria in repeated games with imperfect monitoring," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 682-694, November.
    3. Johannes Horner & Satoru Takahashi & Nicolas Vieille, 2012. "On the Limit Equilibrium Payoff Set in Repeated and Stochastic Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000412, David K. Levine.
    4. Stefano Lovo & Johannes Hörner & Tristan Tomala, 2011. "Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence," Post-Print hal-00630299, HAL.
    5. Renault, Jerome & Scarlatti, Sergio & Scarsini, Marco, 2005. "A folk theorem for minority games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 208-230, November.
    6. Contou-Carrère, Pauline & Tomala, Tristan, 2011. "Finitely repeated games with semi-standard monitoring," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 14-21, January.
    7. Marie Laclau, 2014. "Communication in repeated network games with imperfect monitoring," PSE - Labex "OSE-Ouvrir la Science Economique" halshs-01109156, HAL.
    8. Ashkenazi-Golan, Galit & Lehrer, Ehud, 2019. "Blackwell's comparison of experiments and discounted repeated games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 163-194.
    9. Pauline Contou-Carrère & Tristan Tomala, 2010. "Finitely repeated games with semi-standard monitoring," Post-Print halshs-00524134, HAL.
    10. Flesch, János & Laraki, Rida & Perchet, Vianney, 2018. "Approachability of convex sets in generalized quitting games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 411-431.
    11. Marie Laclau & Tristan Tomala, 2016. "Repeated games with public information revisited," Working Papers hal-01285326, HAL.
    12. Laclau, Marie, 2012. "A folk theorem for repeated games played on a network," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 711-737.
    13. Marie Laclau & Tristan Tomala, 2017. "Repeated games with public deterministic monitoring," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-01503768, HAL.
    14. Heng Liu, 2017. "Correlation and unmediated cheap talk in repeated games with imperfect monitoring," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(4), pages 1037-1069, November.
    15. Takuo Sugaya, 2022. "Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring [Collusion in Dynamic Bertrand Oligopoly with Correlated Private Signals and Communication]," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 89(4), pages 2201-2256.
    16. Sugaya, Takuo & Wolitzky, Alexander, 2017. "Bounding equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with private monitoring," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(2), May.
    17. Heller, Yuval & Solan, Eilon & Tomala, Tristan, 2010. "Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information," MPRA Paper 25895, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    18. Ashkenazi-Golan, Galit & Lehrer, Ehud, 2019. "What you get is what you see: Cooperation in repeated games with observable payoffs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 181(C), pages 197-237.
    19. Marco Scarsini & Sergio Scarlatti & Jérôme Renault, 2008. "Discounted and finitely repeated minority games with public signals," Post-Print hal-00365583, HAL.
    20. Jérôme Renault & Bruno Ziliotto, 2020. "Limit Equilibrium Payoffs in Stochastic Games," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 45(3), pages 889-895, August.

  17. Jérôme Renault, 2001. "3-player repeated games with lack of information on one side," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 30(2), pages 221-245.

    Cited by:

    1. Stefano Lovo & Johannes Hörner & Tristan Tomala, 2011. "Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence," Post-Print hal-00630299, HAL.
    2. Renault, Jerome & Scarlatti, Sergio & Scarsini, Marco, 2005. "A folk theorem for minority games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 208-230, November.
    3. Françoise Forges & Ulrich Horst, 2018. "Sender-receiver games with cooperation," Post-Print hal-02313962, HAL.
    4. Renault, Jerome & Tomala, Tristan, 2004. "Communication equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with imperfect monitoring," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 313-344, November.
    5. Francoise Forges & Ulrich Horst & Antoine Salomon, 2016. "Feasibility and individual rationality in two-person Bayesian games," Post-Print hal-02276751, HAL.
    6. Frederic Koessler & Francoise Forges, 2006. "Multistage communication with and without verifiable types," THEMA Working Papers 2006-14, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
    7. Françoise Forges & Jérôme Renault, 2021. "Strategic information transmission with sender’s approval," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 50(2), pages 475-502, June.
    8. Jérôme Renault & Tristan Tomala, 2011. "General Properties of Long-Run Supergames," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 319-350, June.
    9. Heng Liu, 2017. "Correlation and unmediated cheap talk in repeated games with imperfect monitoring," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(4), pages 1037-1069, November.
    10. Renault, Jerome & Tomala, Tristan, 2004. "Learning the state of nature in repeated games with incomplete information and signals," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 124-156, April.

  18. JÊrÆme Renault & Tristan Tomala, 1998. "Repeated proximity games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 27(4), pages 539-559.
    See citations under working paper version above.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

Access and download statistics for all items

Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 25 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (21) 2003-07-10 2013-11-16 2017-01-15 2017-01-15 2017-01-15 2017-03-05 2019-04-15 2019-04-29 2020-01-27 2021-03-29 2021-04-05 2021-05-24 2021-09-27 2022-04-11 2022-07-25 2022-08-22 2022-08-29 2022-10-24 2022-11-07 2023-04-24 2023-10-16. Author is listed
  2. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (16) 2013-11-16 2017-01-15 2017-01-15 2017-01-15 2019-04-29 2020-01-27 2020-02-10 2021-03-29 2021-05-24 2021-09-27 2022-07-25 2022-07-25 2022-10-24 2022-11-07 2023-04-24 2023-10-16. Author is listed
  3. NEP-COM: Industrial Competition (4) 2018-12-17 2021-04-05 2022-07-25 2022-08-29
  4. NEP-DES: Economic Design (4) 2020-02-10 2022-07-25 2022-10-24 2022-11-07
  5. NEP-ENE: Energy Economics (3) 2018-12-17 2021-04-05 2022-08-29
  6. NEP-REG: Regulation (3) 2018-12-17 2021-04-05 2022-08-29
  7. NEP-IND: Industrial Organization (2) 2021-04-05 2022-08-29
  8. NEP-BAN: Banking (1) 2022-04-11
  9. NEP-GER: German Papers (1) 2023-10-16
  10. NEP-HPE: History and Philosophy of Economics (1) 2017-01-15
  11. NEP-ISF: Islamic Finance (1) 2021-09-27
  12. NEP-ORE: Operations Research (1) 2021-04-05
  13. NEP-UPT: Utility Models and Prospect Theory (1) 2021-05-24
  14. NEP-URE: Urban and Real Estate Economics (1) 2023-04-24

Corrections

All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. For general information on how to correct material on RePEc, see these instructions.

To update listings or check citations waiting for approval, Jerome Renault
(Jerome Renault) should log into the RePEc Author Service.

To make corrections to the bibliographic information of a particular item, find the technical contact on the abstract page of that item. There, details are also given on how to add or correct references and citations.

To link different versions of the same work, where versions have a different title, use this form. Note that if the versions have a very similar title and are in the author's profile, the links will usually be created automatically.

Please note that most corrections can take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.