Repeated Proximity Games
AbstractWe consider repeated games of complete information and imperfect monitoring, where the observation structure is given by a directed graph, i.e. all what a player learns are the actions taken by his neighbours on the graph. We prove that a generalized folk theorem holds if and only if the graph is 2-connected: this means that manipulation of information transmission by one player is impossible if and only if no player is essential for communication. We finally extend this result to the contexts of correlated equilibrium, sequential equilibrium and finitely repeated games.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by UniversitÃ© PanthÃ©on-Sorbonne (Paris 1) in its series Papiers d'Economie MathÃ©matique et Applications with number 97.14.
Length: 26 pages
Date of creation: 1997
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- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
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- Nava, Francesco & Piccione, Michele, 0. "Efficiency in repeated games with local interaction and uncertain local monitoring," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
- Renault, Jerome & Tomala, Tristan, 2004. "Learning the state of nature in repeated games with incomplete information and signals," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 124-156, April.
- Yair Goldberg, 2003. "On the Minmax of Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring: A Computational Example," Discussion Paper Series dp345, The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
- repec:ner:dauphi:urn:hdl:123456789/6102 is not listed on IDEAS
- Jérôme Renault & Tristan Tomala, 2011.
"General Properties of Long-Run Supergames,"
Dynamic Games and Applications,
Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 319-350, June.
- Renault, Jérôme & Tomala, Tristan, 2011. "General Properties of Long-Run Supergames," Open Access publications from University of Toulouse 1 Capitole http://neeo.univ-tlse1.fr, University of Toulouse 1 Capitole.
- Markus Kinateder, 2008.
"Repeated Games Played in a Network,"
2008.22, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Laclau, Marie, 2012. "A folk theorem for repeated games played on a network," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 711-737.
- Renault, Jerome & Tomala, Tristan, 2004. "Communication equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with imperfect monitoring," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 313-344, November.
- Tomala, Tristan, 2009. "Perfect communication equilibria in repeated games with imperfect monitoring," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 682-694, November.
- Olivier Gossner & Rida Laraki & Tristan Tomala, 2004. "Maxmin computation and optimal correlation in repeated games with signals," Working Papers hal-00242940, HAL.
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