Efficiency in repeated games with local interaction and uncertain local monitoring
AbstractThe paper discusses community enforcement in infinitely repeated, two-action games with local interaction and uncertain monitoring. Each player interacts with and observes only a fixed set of opponents, of whom he is privately informed. the main result shows that when beliefs about the monitoring structure have full support, efficiency can be sustained with sequential equilibria that are independent of the players' beliefs. Stronger results are obtained when only acyclic monitoring structures are allowed or players have unit discount rates. These equilibria satisfy numerous robustness properties.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library in its series LSE Research Online Documents on Economics with number 54250.
Length: 38 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2012
Date of revision:
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- J1 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2014-03-08 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2014-03-08 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-GTH-2014-03-08 (Game Theory)
- NEP-HPE-2014-03-08 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2014-03-08 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-PBE-2014-03-08 (Public Economics)
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