Repeated proximity games
AbstractWe consider repeated games with complete information and imperfect monitoring, where each player is assigned a fixed subset of players and only observes the moves chosen by the players in this subset. This structure is naturally represented by a directed graph. We prove that a generalized folk theorem holds for any payoff function if and only if the graph is 2-connected, and then extend this result to the context of finitely repeated games.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal International Journal of Game Theory.
Volume (Year): 27 (1998)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
Note: Received June 1997/Revised version March 1998
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Other versions of this item:
- Renault, J. & Tomala, T., 1997. "Repeated Proximity Games," Papiers d'Economie MathÃÂ©matique et Applications 97.14, UniversitÃ© PanthÃ©on-Sorbonne (Paris 1).
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
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- Olivier Gossner & Rida Laraki & Tristan Tomala, 2004. "Maxmin computation and optimal correlation in repeated games with signals," Working Papers hal-00242940, HAL.
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- Joyee Deb & Julio González Díaz & Jérôme Renault, 2013. "Uniform Folk Theorems in Repeated Anonymous Random Matching Games," Working Papers 13-16, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
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