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On the Minmax of Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring: A Computational Example

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  • Yair Goldberg

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    Abstract

    The minmax in repeated games with imperfect monitoring can differ from the minmax of those games with perfect monitoring. This can happen when two or more players are able to gain common information known only to themselves, and utilize this information at a later stage. Gossner and Tomala [1] showed that in a class of such games, the minmax is given by a weighted average of the payoffs of two main strategies: one in which the information is gained, and the other in which the information is utilized. While this result is implicit, all examples analyzed to date require a single main strategy in which information is created and utilized simultaneously. We show that two strategies are indeed needed by providing and solving a concrete example of a three-player game.

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    File URL: http://ratio.huji.ac.il/sites/default/files/publications/Yair345.pdf
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem in its series Discussion Paper Series with number dp345.

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    Length: 17 pages
    Date of creation: Dec 2003
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    Handle: RePEc:huj:dispap:dp345

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    1. O. Gossner & P. Hernandez, 2001. "On the complexity of coordination," THEMA Working Papers 2001-21, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
    2. Gossner, Olivier & Tomala, Tristan, 2003. "Entropy and codification in repeated games with imperfect monitoring," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/6885, Paris Dauphine University.
    3. GOSSNER, Olivier & TOMALA, Tristan, 2003. "Entropy and codification in repeated games with imperfect monitoring," CORE Discussion Papers 2003033, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    4. Renault, J. & Tomala, T., 1997. "Repeated Proximity Games," Papiers d'Economie Mathématique et Applications 97.14, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1).
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    Cited by:
    1. Olivier Gossner & Rida Laraki & Tristan Tomala, 2004. "Maxmin computation and optimal correlation in repeated games with signals," Working Papers hal-00242940, HAL.

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