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Modeling the Economic Interaction of Agents With Diverse Abilities to Recognize Equilibrium Patterns

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Author Info
Michele Piccione (London School of Economics,)
Ariel Rubinstein (Tel Aviv University and Princeton University,)

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Abstract

We model differences among agents in their ability to recognize temporal patterns of prices. Using the concept of DeBruijn sequences in two dynamic models of markets, we demonstrate the existence of equilibria in which prices fluctuate in a pattern that is independent of the fundamentals and that can be recognized only by the more competent agents. (JEL: C7, D4, S477) Copyright (c) 2003 The European Economic Association.

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Article provided by MIT Press in its journal Journal of the European Economic Association.

Volume (Year): 1 (2003)
Issue (Month): 1 (03)
Pages: 212-223
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Handle: RePEc:tpr:jeurec:v:1:y:2003:i:1:p:212-223

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Gilboa Itzhak & Schmeidler David, 1994. "Infinite Histories and Steady Orbits in Repeated Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 370-399, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1991. "Comments on the Interpretation of Game Theory," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(4), pages 909-24, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Neyman, Abraham, 1985. "Bounded complexity justifies cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 227-229. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Lehrer Ehud, 1994. "Finitely Many Players with Bounded Recall in Infinitely Repeated Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 390-405, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Lehrer, Ehud, 1988. "Repeated games with stationary bounded recall strategies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 130-144, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. O. Gossner & P. Hernandez, 2001. "On the complexity of coordination," THEMA Working Papers 2001-21, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise. [Downloadable!]
  7. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1993. "On Price Recognition and Computational Complexity in a Monopolistic Model," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(3), pages 473-84, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Kfir Eliaz & Ran Spiegler, 2004. "Contracting with Diversely Naïve Agents," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000530, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Yuval Salant, 2003. "Limited Computational Resources Favor Rationality," Discussion Paper Series dp320, Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem. [Downloadable!]
  3. B. Luppi, 2006. "Price Competition over Boundedly Rational Agents," Working Papers 565, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Università di Bologna. [Downloadable!]
  4. Ran Spiegler, 2005. "Competition over Agents with Boundedly Rational Expectations," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000535, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  5. Rani Spiegler, 2005. "The Market for Quacks," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000634, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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