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Infinite Histories and Steady Orbits in Repeated Games

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Author Info
Gilboa Itzhak
Schmeidler David

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

Volume (Year): 6 (1994)
Issue (Month): 3 (May)
Pages: 370-399
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Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:6:y:1994:i:3:p:370-399

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Aumann, Robert J. & Sorin, Sylvain, 1989. "Cooperation and bounded recall," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 5-39, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Ehud Kalai & William Stanford, 1986. "Finite Rationality and Interpersonal Complexity in Repeated Games," Discussion Papers 679, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Aumann, Robert J., 1974. "Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 67-96, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Herbert A. Simon, 1978. "On How to Decide What to Do," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 9(2), pages 494-507, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Gilboa, Itzhak, 1988. "The complexity of computing best-response automata in repeated games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 342-352, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Neyman, Abraham, 1985. "Bounded complexity justifies cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 227-229. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Lehrer, Ehud, 1988. "Repeated games with stationary bounded recall strategies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 130-144, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  1. George Mailath & Wojciech Olszewski, 2008. "Folk theorems with Bounded Recall under(Almost) Perfect Monitoring," Discussion Papers 1462, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. George J. Mailath & : Wojciech Olszewski, 2008. "Folk Theorems with Bounded Recall under (Almost) Perfect Monitoring, Second Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 08-027, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 28 Jul 2008. [Downloadable!]
  3. Gilad Bavly & Abraham Neyman, 2003. "Online Concealed Correlation by Boundedly Rational Players," Discussion Paper Series dp336, Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem. [Downloadable!]
  4. Michele Piccione & Ariel Rubinstein, 2003. "Modeling the Economic Interaction of Agents with Diverse Abilities to Recognize Equilibrium Patterns," Levine's Bibliography 506439000000000108, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Itzhak Gilboa & Dov Samet, 1991. "Absorbent Stable Sets," Discussion Papers 935, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  6. Nabil I. Al-Najjar & Ramon Casadesus-Masanell & Emre Ozdenoren, 1999. "Subjective Representation of Complexity," Discussion Papers 1249, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  7. Ramon Marimon & Ellen McGrattan, 1993. "On Adaptive Learning in Strategic Games," Economics Working Papers 24, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
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