Playing off-line games with bounded rationality
AbstractWe study a two-person zero-sum game where players simultaneously choose sequences of actions, and the overall payoff is the average of a one-shot payoff over the joint sequence. We consider the maxmin value of the game played in pure strategies by boundedly rational players and model bounded rationality by introducing complexity limitations. First we define the complexity of a sequence by its smallest period (a nonperiodic sequence being of infinite complexity) and study the maxmin of the game where player 1 is restricted to strategies with complexity at most n and player 2 is restricted to strategies with complexity at most m. We study the asymptotics of this value and a complete characterization in the matching pennies case. We extend the analysis of matching pennies to strategies with bounded recall.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Mathematical Social Sciences.
Volume (Year): 56 (2008)
Issue (Month): 2 (September)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505565
C72 C73 primary Games/group decisions Noncooperative Zero-sum games Periodic sequences Bounded recall de Bruijn graphs Oblivious strategy;
Other versions of this item:
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
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