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Growth of Strategy Sets, Entropy and Nonstationary Bounded Recall

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  • Abraham Neyman Null

    (Hebrew University)

  • Daijiro Okada

    ()
    (Rutgers University)

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    Abstract

    This paper initiates the study of long term interactions where players' bounded rationality varies over time. Time dependent bounded rationality is reflected in part in the number $\psi(t)$ of distinct strategies in the first $t$-stages. We examine how the growth rate of $\psi_i(t)$ affects equilibrium outcomes of repeated games, and, as a special case, we study the repeated games with nonstationary bounded recall.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Rutgers University, Department of Economics in its series Departmental Working Papers with number 200514.

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    Date of creation: 24 Nov 2005
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    Handle: RePEc:rut:rutres:200514

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    Related research

    Keywords: bounded rationality; strategy set growth; strategic complexity; nonstationary bounded recall; repeated games;

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    References

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    1. Robert J. Aumann & Lloyd S. Shapley, 2013. "Long Term Competition -- A Game-Theoretic Analysis," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 14(2), pages 627-640, November.
    2. Lehrer, Ehud, 1988. "Repeated games with stationary bounded recall strategies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 130-144, October.
    3. Ben-Porath Elchanan, 1993. "Repeated Games with Finite Automata," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 17-32, February.
    4. Olivier Gossner & Penelope Hernandez & Abraham Neyman, 2004. "Optimal Use of Communication Resources," Discussion Paper Series dp377, The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    5. Neyman, Abraham & Okada, Daijiro, 2000. "Repeated Games with Bounded Entropy," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 228-247, February.
    6. Neyman, Abraham, 1985. "Bounded complexity justifies cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 227-229.
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    Cited by:
    1. Abraham Neyman, 2008. "Learning Effectiveness and Memory Size," Discussion Paper Series dp476, The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    2. Ron Peretz, 2007. "The Strategic Value of Recall," Discussion Paper Series dp470, The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    3. Ron Peretz, 2007. "The Strategic Value of Recall," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001774, UCLA Department of Economics.

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