Growth of Strategy Sets, Entropy and Nonstationary Bounded Recall

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Growth of Strategy Sets, Entropy and Nonstationary Bounded Recall

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Abraham Neyman Null (Hebrew University)
Daijiro Okada () (Rutgers University)

Abstract

This paper initiates the study of long term interactions where players' bounded rationality varies over time. Time dependent bounded rationality is reflected in part in the number $\psi(t)$ of distinct strategies in the first $t$-stages. We examine how the growth rate of $\psi_i(t)$ affects equilibrium outcomes of repeated games, and, as a special case, we study the repeated games with nonstationary bounded recall.

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Paper provided by Rutgers University, Department of Economics in its series Departmental Working Papers with number 200514.

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Date of creation: 24 Nov 2005
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Handle: RePEc:rut:rutres:200514

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

NEP-ALL-2006-01-24 (All new papers)
NEP-GTH-2006-01-24 (Game Theory)

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

Robert J. Aumann & Lloyd S. Shapley, 1992. "Long Term Competition-A Game Theoretic Analysis," UCLA Economics Working Papers 676, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Neyman, Abraham & Okada, Daijiro, 2000. "Repeated Games with Bounded Entropy," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 228-247, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Ben-Porath Elchanan, 1993. "Repeated Games with Finite Automata," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 17-32, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Neyman, Abraham, 1985. "Bounded complexity justifies cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 227-229. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Lehrer, Ehud, 1988. "Repeated games with stationary bounded recall strategies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 130-144, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Olivier Gossner & Penelope Hernandez & Abraham Neyman, 2004. "Optimal Use of Communication Resources," Discussion Paper Series dp377, Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Olivier Gossner & Abraham Neyman & Penélope Hernández, 2005. "Optimal Use Of Communication Resources," Working Papers. Serie AD 2005-06, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie). [Downloadable!]
- Olivier Gossner & Penélope Hernández & Abraham Neyman, 2006. "Optimal Use of Communication Resources," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 74(6), pages 1603-1636, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Ron Peretz, 2007. "The Strategic Value of Recall," Discussion Paper Series dp470, Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem. [Downloadable!]
Abraham Neyman, 2008. "Learning Effectiveness and Memory Size," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000002427, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Abraham Neyman, 2008. "Learning Effectiveness and Memory Size," Discussion Paper Series dp476, Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem. [Downloadable!]
- Abraham Neyman, 2008. "Learning Effectiveness and Memory Size," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001945, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Ron Peretz, 2007. "The Strategic Value of Recall," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001774, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]

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