Growth of strategy sets, entropy, and nonstationary bounded recall
AbstractThe paper initiates the study of long term interactions where players' bounded rationality varies over time. Time dependent bounded rationality, for player i, is reflected in part in the number [psi]i(t) of distinct strategies available to him in the first t-stages. We examine how the growth rate of [psi]i(t) affects equilibrium outcomes of repeated games. An upper bound on the individually rational payoff is derived for a class of two-player repeated games, and the derived bound is shown to be tight. As a special case we study the repeated games with nonstationary bounded recall and show that, a player can guarantee the minimax payoff of the stage game, even against a player with full recall, by remembering a vanishing fraction of the past. A version of the folk theorem is provided for this class of games.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.
Volume (Year): 66 (2009)
Issue (Month): 1 (May)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836
Bounded rationality Strategy set growth Strategic complexity Nonstationary bounded recall Repeated games Entropy;
Other versions of this item:
- Abraham Neyman & Daijiro Okada, 2005. "Growth of Strategy Sets, Entropy, and Nonstationary Bounded Recall," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000920, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Abraham Neyman & Daijiro Okada, 2005. "Growth of Strategy Sets, Entropy, and Nonstationary Bounded Recall," Discussion Paper Series dp411, The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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