The strategic value of recall
AbstractThis work studies the value of two-person zero-sum repeated games in which at least one of the players is restricted to (mixtures of) bounded recall strategies. A (pure) k-recall strategy is a strategy that relies only on the last k periods of history. This work improves previous results (Lehrer, 1988; Neyman and Okada, 2009) on repeated games with bounded recall. We provide an explicit formula for the asymptotic value of the repeated game as a function of the one-stage game, the duration of the repeated game, and the recall of the agents.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.
Volume (Year): 74 (2012)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836
Bounded recall; Bounded memory; Bounded rationality; Repeated games; Entropy; de Bruijn sequences;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
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