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Optimal Use of Communication Resources

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Author Info
Olivier Gossner
Penélope Hernández
Abraham Neyman

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Abstract

We study a repeated game with asymmetric information about a dynamic state of nature. In the course of the game, the better-informed player can communicate some or all of his information to the other. Our model covers costly and/or bounded communication. We characterize the set of equilibrium payoffs and contrast these with the communication equilibrium payoffs, which by definition entail no communication costs. Copyright The Econometric Society 2006.

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00720.x
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Econometric Society in its journal Econometrica.

Volume (Year): 74 (2006)
Issue (Month): 6 (November)
Pages: 1603-1636
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Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:74:y:2006:i:6:p:1603-1636

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Ben-Porath, Elchanan, 2003. "Cheap talk in games with incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 108(1), pages 45-71, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Forges, Francoise M, 1986. "An Approach to Communication Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(6), pages 1375-85, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Gerardi, Dino, 2004. "Unmediated communication in games with complete and incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 114(1), pages 104-131, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Forges, Francoise, 1990. "Universal Mechanisms," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(6), pages 1341-64, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Radner, Roy, 1993. "The Organization of Decentralized Information Processing," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1109-46, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Myerson, Roger B, 1986. "Multistage Games with Communication," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(2), pages 323-58, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Arrow, Kenneth J, 1985. "Informational Structure of the Firm," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(2), pages 303-07, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Abraham Neyman & Daijiro Okada, 2005. "Growth of Strategy Sets, Entropy, and Nonstationary Bounded Recall," Discussion Paper Series dp411, Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Amparo Urbano & Penélope Hernández, 2007. "Codification Schemes And Finite Automata," Working Papers. Serie AD 2006-28, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie). [Downloadable!]
  3. Abraham Neyman Null & Daijiro Okada, 2005. "Growth of Strategy Sets, Entropy and Nonstationary Bounded Recall," Departmental Working Papers 200514, Rutgers University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. Abraham Neyman, 2008. "Learning Effectiveness and Memory Size," Discussion Paper Series dp476, Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Olivier Gossner & Rida Laraki & Tristan Tomala, 2004. "Maxmin computation and optimal correlation in repeated games with signals," Post-Print hal-00242940_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
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