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Optimal Use of Communication Resources

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Author Info

  • Olivier Gossner
  • Penélope Hernández
  • Abraham Neyman

Abstract

We study a repeated game with asymmetric information about a dynamic state of nature. In the course of the game, the better-informed player can communicate some or all of his information to the other. Our model covers costly and/or bounded communication. We characterize the set of equilibrium payoffs and contrast these with the communication equilibrium payoffs, which by definition entail no communication costs. Copyright The Econometric Society 2006.

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00720.x
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Econometric Society in its journal Econometrica.

Volume (Year): 74 (2006)
Issue (Month): 6 (November)
Pages: 1603-1636

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Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:74:y:2006:i:6:p:1603-1636

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References

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  1. Forges, F., 1984. "An approach to communication equilibria," CORE Discussion Papers 1984035, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  2. Roger B. Myerson, 1984. "Multistage Games with Communication," Discussion Papers 590, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  3. Gerardi, Dino, 2004. "Unmediated communication in games with complete and incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 114(1), pages 104-131, January.
  4. Ben-Porath, Elchanan, 2003. "Cheap talk in games with incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 108(1), pages 45-71, January.
  5. FORGES, Françoise, . "Universal mechanisms," CORE Discussion Papers RP -914, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  6. V.D. Divekar, 1972. "Communication," The Indian Economic & Social History Review, , vol. 9(2), pages 235-238, June.
  7. Radner, Roy, 1993. "The Organization of Decentralized Information Processing," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1109-46, September.
  8. Arrow, Kenneth J, 1985. "Informational Structure of the Firm," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(2), pages 303-07, May.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Antonio Cabrales & Olivier Gossner & Roberto Serrano, 2010. "Entropy and the value of information for investors," Working Papers 2010-17, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  2. Olivier Gossner & Rida Laraki & Tristan Tomala, 2004. "Maxmin computation and optimal correlation in repeated games with signals," Working Papers hal-00242940, HAL.
  3. Hertel, Johanna & Smith, John, 2010. "Not so cheap talk: Costly and discrete communication," MPRA Paper 23560, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  4. Dietrichson, Jens & Jochem, Torsten, 2014. "Organizational Coordination and Costly Communication with Boundedly Rational Agents," Working Papers 2014:2, Lund University, Department of Economics.
  5. Gilad Bavly & Abraham Neyman, 2014. "Online Concealed Correlation and Bounded Rationality," Discussion Paper Series dp659, The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
  6. Abraham Neyman & Daijiro Okada, 2005. "Growth of Strategy Sets, Entropy, and Nonstationary Bounded Recall," Discussion Paper Series dp411, The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
  7. Abraham Neyman, 2008. "Learning Effectiveness and Memory Size," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000001945, David K. Levine.
  8. Hernández, Penélope & Urbano, Amparo, 2008. "Codification schemes and finite automata," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 56(3), pages 395-409, November.
  9. Abraham Neyman Null & Daijiro Okada, 2005. "Growth of Strategy Sets, Entropy and Nonstationary Bounded Recall," Departmental Working Papers 200514, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
  10. Irene Valsecchi, 2013. "The expert problem: a survey," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 14(4), pages 303-331, November.
  11. repec:hal:wpaper:halshs-00648884 is not listed on IDEAS
  12. Aurora García-Gallego & Penélope Hernández-Rojas & Amalia Rodrigo-González, 2013. "Endogenous vs. Exogenous Transmission of Information: An Experiment," Working Papers 2013/06, Economics Department, Universitat Jaume I, Castellón (Spain).

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