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Correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information revisited

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Author Info
FORGES, Franoise
Abstract

A mistake in ÒFive legitimate deÞnitions of correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete informationÓ motivates a re-examination of some extensions of the solution concept that Aumann introduced.

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Paper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers with number 2006041.

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Date of creation: 01 May 2006
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Handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:2006041

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  1. Aumann, Robert J, 1987. "Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(1), pages 1-18, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Forges, Francoise & Koessler, Frederic, 2005. "Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(7), pages 793-811, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Forges, Francoise M, 1986. "An Approach to Communication Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(6), pages 1375-85, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Aumann, Robert J., 1974. "Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 67-96, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Gerardi, Dino, 2004. "Unmediated communication in games with complete and incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 114(1), pages 104-131, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & Stephen Morris, 2005. "Interim Rationalizability," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000526, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Forges, Francoise, 1990. "Universal Mechanisms," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(6), pages 1341-64, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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