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A Detail-Free Mediator

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  • Vida, Péter
  • Azacis, Helmuts

    ()
    (Cardiff Business School)

Abstract

We present an extension to any finite complete information game with two players. In the extension, players are allowed to communicate directly and, additionally, send private messages to a simple, detail-free mediator, which, in turn, makes public announcements as a deterministic function of the private messages. The extension captures situations in which people engage in face-to-face communication and can observe the opponent's face during the conversation before choosing actions in some underlying game. We prove that the set of Nash equilibrium payoffs of the extended game approximately coincides with the set of correlated equilibrium payoffs of any underlying game.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section in its series Cardiff Economics Working Papers with number E2012/10.

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Length: 28 pages
Date of creation: May 2012
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cdf:wpaper:2012/10

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Keywords: Correlated equilibrium; detail-free mechanism; mediated pre-play communication;

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References

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  1. Robert J. Aumann & Sergiu Hart, 2003. "Long Cheap Talk," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(6), pages 1619-1660, November.
  2. Forges, Françoise & Vida, Péter, 2013. "Implementation of communication equilibria by correlated cheap talk: The two-player case," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 8(1), January.
  3. Ben-Porath, Elchanan, 2003. "Cheap talk in games with incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 108(1), pages 45-71, January.
  4. Gossner, Olivier, 2000. "Comparison of Information Structures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 44-63, January.
  5. Gossner, Olivier & Vieille, Nicolas, 2001. "Repeated Communication Through the Mechanism And," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/6031, Paris Dauphine University.
  6. Heller, Yuval, 2010. "Minority-proof cheap-talk protocol," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 394-400, July.
  7. Olivier Gossner & Nicolas Vieille, 2001. "Repeated communication through the mechanism," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 30(1), pages 41-60.
  8. Xavier Jarque & Clara Ponsati & Jozsef Sakovics, 2004. "Mediation: Incomplete information bargaining with filtered communication," ESE Discussion Papers 75, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
  9. Cavaliere, Alberto, 2001. " Coordination and the Provision of Discrete Public Goods by Correlated Equilibria," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 3(3), pages 235-55.
  10. Ehud Lehrer & Sylvain Sorin, 1994. "One-Shot Public Mediated Talk," Discussion Papers 1108, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  11. Ehud Lehrer, 1988. "Internal Correlation in Repeated Games," Discussion Papers 800, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  12. Amparo Urbano & Jose Vila, 2004. "Computationally restricted unmediated talk under incomplete information," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 23(2), pages 283-320, January.
  13. Amparo Urbano & Jose E. Vila, 2002. "Computational Complexity and Communication: Coordination in Two-Player Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(5), pages 1893-1927, September.
  14. FORGES, Françoise, . "Universal mechanisms," CORE Discussion Papers RP -914, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  15. GOSSNER, Olivier, 1997. "Secure protocols or how communication generates correlation," CORE Discussion Papers 1997092, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  16. Dino Gerardi, 2002. "Unmediated Communication in Games with Complete and Incomplete Information," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1371, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  17. Aumann, Robert J., 1974. "Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 67-96, March.
  18. Gossner, Olivier, 1998. "Secure Protocols or How Communication Generates Correlation," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/6244, Paris Dauphine University.
  19. Robert J. Aumann, 1995. "Repeated Games with Incomplete Information," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262011476, December.
  20. Lehrer, Ehud, 1996. "Mediated Talk," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 25(2), pages 177-88.
  21. Ben-Porath, Elchanan, 1998. "Correlation without Mediation: Expanding the Set of Equilibrium Outcomes by "Cheap" Pre-play Procedures," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 80(1), pages 108-122, May.
  22. R. Vijay Krishna, 2004. "Communication in Games of Incomplete Information: The Two-player Case," ESE Discussion Papers 125, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
  23. Vanessa Teague, 2008. "Problems With Coordination in Two-Player Games: Comment on "Computational Complexity and Communication"," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 76(6), pages 1559-1564, November.
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Cited by:
  1. Forges, Françoise & Vida, Péter, 2013. "Implementation of communication equilibria by correlated cheap talk: The two-player case," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 8(1), January.
  2. Maria Goltsman & Gregory Pavlov, 2012. "Communication in Cournot Oligopoly," UWO Department of Economics Working Papers 20121, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.

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