The notion of mediated talk in which players communicate through a mediator before starting the game is introduced. It shows that a deterministic mechanized mediator receiving private inputs and producing public outputs can generate any rational correlated equilibrium with rational probabilities by a self-enforcing procedure.
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Ehud Lehrer & Sylvain Sorin, 1994.
"One-Shot Public Mediated Talk,"
Discussion Papers
1108, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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