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Secure Protocols or How Communication Generates Correlation

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Author Info
Gossner, Olivier

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WJ3-45J5B4J-G/2/7d766ac7e4e7806321081939576a7d90
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 83 (1998)
Issue (Month): 1 (November)
Pages: 69-89
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Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:83:y:1998:i:1:p:69-89

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869

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  1. Ehud Lehrer & Dinah Rosenberg, 2003. "What restrictions do Bayesian games impose on the value of information?," Game Theory and Information 0312005, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Ehud Lehrer & Dinah Rosenberg, 2003. "Information and Its Value in Zero-Sum Repeated Games," Game Theory and Information 0312003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  3. Anirban Kar, Indrajit Ray and Robedrto Serrano, 2005. "Multiple Equilibria as a Difficulty in Understanding Correlated Distributions," Discussion Papers 05-18, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Peter Vida, 2005. "A Detail-free Mediator and the 3 Player Case," IEHAS Discussion Papers 0511, Institute of Economics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences. [Downloadable!]
  5. Indrajit Ray, 2002. "Multiple Equilibrium Problem and Non-Canonical Correlation Devices," Working Papers 2002-24, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  6. Adam Tauman Kalai & Ehud Kalai & Dov Samet, 2007. "Voluntary Commitments Lead to Efficiency," Discussion Papers 1444, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  7. GOSSNERÊ, Olivier & VIEILLE, Nicolas, 1998. "Repeated communication through the mechanism ÒandÓ," CORE Discussion Papers 1998056, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE). [Downloadable!]
  8. Hannu Vartiainen, 2009. "A Simple Model of Secure Public Communication," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 67(1), pages 101-122, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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