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What restrictions do Bayesian games impose on the value of information?

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Author Info

  • Ehud Lehrer

    (Tel Aviv U.)

  • Dinah Rosenberg

    (U. Paris Nord)

Abstract

In a Bayesian game players play an unknown game. Before the game starts some players may receive a signal regarding the specific game actually played. Typically, information structures that determine different signals, induce different equilibrium payoffs.In zero-sum games the equilibrium payoff measures the value of the particular information structure which induces it. We pose a question as to what restrictions do Bayesian games impose on the value of information. We provide answers in two kinds of information structures: symmetric, where both players are equally informed, and one-sided where only one player is informed.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 0312005.

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Date of creation: 11 Dec 2003
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Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0312005

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Keywords: value of information; zero-sum; information structure; partition; Beyesian game;

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References

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  1. Debreu, Gerard, 1974. "Excess demand functions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 15-21, March.
  2. Gossner, Olivier, 2010. "Ability and knowledge," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 95-106, May.
  3. GOSSNER, Olivier, 1997. "Secure protocols or how communication generates correlation," CORE Discussion Papers 1997092, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  4. Hirshleifer, Jack, 1971. "The Private and Social Value of Information and the Reward to Inventive Activity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 61(4), pages 561-74, September.
  5. Susan Athey & Jonathan Levin, 1998. "The Value of Information In Monotone Decision Problems," Working papers 98-24, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  6. Robert J Aumann, 1999. "Agreeing to Disagree," Levine's Working Paper Archive 512, David K. Levine.
  7. Sulganik,E. & Zilcha,I., 1996. "The value of Information: the Case of Signal-Dependent Opportunity Sets," Papers 1-96, Tel Aviv.
  8. Aumann, Robert J., 1974. "Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 67-96, March.
  9. Sonnenschein, Hugo, 1973. "Do Walras' identity and continuity characterize the class of community excess demand functions?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 6(4), pages 345-354, August.
  10. Kamien, Morton I. & Tauman, Yair & Zamir, Shmuel, 1990. "On the value of information in a strategic conflict," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 2(2), pages 129-153, June.
  11. Schlee, Edward, 1990. " The Value of Information in Anticipated Utility Theory," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 3(1), pages 83-92, March.
  12. Mertens, J.-F., 1986. "Repeated games," CORE Discussion Papers 1986024, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  13. Itzhak Gilboa & Ehud Lehrer, 1989. "The Value of Information -- An Axiomatic Approach," Discussion Papers 835, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  14. Ehud Lehrer & Dinah Rosenberg, 2003. "Information and Its Value in Zero-Sum Repeated Games," Game Theory and Information 0312003, EconWPA.
  15. Gossner, Olivier, 1998. "Secure Protocols or How Communication Generates Correlation," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/6244, Paris Dauphine University.
  16. GOSSNER, Olivier, 1997. "Comparison of information structures," CORE Discussion Papers 1997091, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  17. Bassan, B. & Gossner, O. & Scarsini, M. & Zamir, S., 1999. "A Class of Games with Positive Value of Information," Papers 99-32, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor..
  18. Mantel, Rolf R., 1974. "On the characterization of aggregate excess demand," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 348-353, March.
  19. Nicola Persico, 1997. "Information Acquisition in Auctions," UCLA Economics Working Papers 762, UCLA Department of Economics.
  20. Neyman, Abraham, 1991. "The positive value of information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(3), pages 350-355, August.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Gossner, Olivier, 2010. "Ability and knowledge," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 95-106, May.
  2. repec:hal:journl:halshs-00390625 is not listed on IDEAS
  3. Yann Rébillé, 2010. "A Radon-Nikodym approach to measure information," Working Papers hal-00526251, HAL.
  4. Ezra Einy & Ori Haimanko & Biligbaatar Tumendemberel, 2012. "Continuity of the value and optimal strategies when common priors change," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 41(4), pages 829-849, November.
  5. Tanja Hörtnagl & Rudolf Kerschbamer, 2014. "How the Value of Information Shapes the Value of Commitment Or: Why the Value of Commitment Does Not Vanish," Working Papers 2014-03, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck.

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