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A Class of Games with Positive Value of Information

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Author Info
Bassan, B.
Gossner, O.
Scarsini, M.
Zamir, S.

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

It is well known that, whereas in one-agent contexts the value of information is always positive, in strategic situations, this is not always the case. We will consider the class of games for which, under a specific information structure, there exists a unique Pareto payoff profile, and we show that any Nash-equilibrium payoff profile induced by a coarser information structure is Pareto dominated by this unique Pareto payoff profile. Therefore for these games the value of information is positive.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor. in its series Papers with number 99-32.

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Length: 9 pages
Date of creation: 1999
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:pnegmi:99-32

Contact details of provider:
Postal: THEMA, Universite de Paris X-Nanterre, U.F.R. de science economiques, gestion, mathematiques et informatique, 200, avenue de la Republique 92001 Nanterre CEDEX.

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Related research
Keywords: INFORMATION GAME THEORY UNCERTAINTY

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Kamien, Morton I. & Tauman, Yair & Zamir, Shmuel, 1990. "On the value of information in a strategic conflict," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 2(2), pages 129-153, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Hirshleifer, Jack, 1971. "The Private and Social Value of Information and the Reward to Inventive Activity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 61(4), pages 561-74, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Gossner, O., 1997. "Comparison of Information Structures," Papers 9791, Catholique de Louvain - Center for Operations Research and Economics.
    Other versions:
  4. Neyman, Abraham, 1991. "The positive value of information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(3), pages 350-355, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Ehud Lehrer & Dinah Rosenberg, 2003. "What restrictions do Bayesian games impose on the value of information?," Game Theory and Information 0312005, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Ehud Lehrer & Dinah Rosenberg, 2003. "Information and Its Value in Zero-Sum Repeated Games," Game Theory and Information 0312003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
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