Experimental Design to Persuade
AbstractA sender chooses ex ante how information will be disclosed ex post. A receiver obtains public information and information disclosed by the sender. Then he takes one of two actions. The sender wishes to maximize the probability that the receiver takes the desired action. I show that the sender optimally discloses only whether the receivers utility is above a cutoff. I derive necessary and sufficient conditions for the senders and receivers welfare to be monotonic in information. Most notably, the senders welfare increases with the precision of the senders potential information and decreases with the precision of public information.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by School of Economics, The University of New South Wales in its series Discussion Papers with number 2013-17.
Length: 28 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2013
Date of revision:
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More information through EDIRC
information; disclosure; persuasion; stochastic orders;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C44 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods: Special Topics - - - Operations Research; Statistical Decision Theory
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-07-15 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2013-07-15 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-MIC-2013-07-15 (Microeconomics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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