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Positive value of information in games

Author

Listed:
  • Bruno Bassan
  • Olivier Gossner
  • Marco Scarsini
  • Shmuel Zamir

Abstract

We exhibit a general class of interactive decision situations in which all the agents benefit from more information. This class includes as a special case the classical comparison of statistical experiments a la Blackwell.

Suggested Citation

  • Bruno Bassan & Olivier Gossner & Marco Scarsini & Shmuel Zamir, 2001. "Positive value of information in games," ICER Working Papers - Applied Mathematics Series 26-2003, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research, revised Jul 2003.
  • Handle: RePEc:icr:wpmath:26-2003
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    References listed on IDEAS

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      • Mertens,Jean-François & Sorin,Sylvain & Zamir,Shmuel, 2015. "Repeated Games," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107662636.
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