Suppose, following Kreps & Porteus (1978), that an agent values information not only to make contingent plans but also for itself; that is, intrinsically. What, then, is the relationship between an agent's attitude towards information and her attitude towards risk? If an agent always prefers more information, does this imply that she obeys the independence axiom?
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Paper provided by Australian National University - Department of Economics in its series Papers with number
323.
Length: 26 pages Date of creation: 1997 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:fth:aunaec:323
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Find related papers by JEL classification: D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
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