Preference for Information and Dynamic Consistency
AbstractWe provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a dynamically consistent agent always to prefer more informative signals (in single-agent problems). These conditions do not imply recursivity, reduction or independence. We provide a simple definition of dynamically consistent behavior, and we discuss whether an intrinsic information lover (say, an anxious person) is likely to be dynamically consistent.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University in its series Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers with number 1208.
Length: 18 pages
Date of creation: Jan 1999
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Theory and Decision (2000), 48: 263-286
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Phone: (203) 432-3702
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Web page: http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/
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Postal: Cowles Foundation, Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA
Other versions of this item:
- Simon Grant & Atsushi Kajii & Ben Polak, 2000. "Preference for Information and Dynamic Consistency," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 48(3), pages 263-286, May.
- D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
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