Timing-independence implies that individuals are indifferent between a sequential choice problem and a planned choice problem which are strategically equivalent except for the timing of resolution of the uncertainty. This paper reports an experiment in which we investigate whether the timing of resolution of the uncertainty affects individual preferences. We elicit individual preferences for three strategically equivalent decisions problems. The experimental results suggest that timing- independence is an inappropriate assumption of individual preferences. The paper discusses possible implications of such findings.
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Paper provided by Department of Economics, University of York in its series Discussion Papers with number
99/26.
Length: Date of creation: Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:yor:yorken:99/26
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