Valuing Othersâ€™ Information under Imperfect Expectations
AbstractSometimes we believe that others receive harmful information. However, Marschakâ€™s value of information framework always assigns non-negative value under expected utility: it starts from the decision makerâ€™s beliefs â€“ and one can never anticipate informationâ€™s harmfulness for oneself. The impact of decision makersâ€™ capabilities to process information and of their expectations remains hidden behind the individual and subjective perspective Marschakâ€™s framework assumes. By introducing a second decision maker as a point of reference, this paper introduces a way for evaluating othersâ€™ information from a cross-individual, imperfect expectations perspective for agents maximising expected utility. We define the cross-value of information that can become negative â€“ then the information is â€œharmfulâ€\x9D from a cross-individual perspective â€“ and we define (mutual) cost of limited information processing capabilities and imperfect expectations as an opportunity cost from this same point of reference. The simple relationship between these two expected utility-based concepts and Marschakâ€™s framework is shown, and we discuss evaluating short-term reactions of stock market prices to new information as an important domain of valuing othersâ€™ information. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Theory and Decision.
Volume (Year): 62 (2007)
Issue (Month): 4 (May)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100341
value of information; decision under risk; imperfect expectations; cross-value of information; harmful information; stock market prices; D80; D82; D83;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Hagen LINDSTÃ„DT, 2001. "More nonconcavities in information processing functions," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 51(2), pages 351-365, December.
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"Preference for Information,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
1114, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
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- John Conlisk, 1996. "Why Bounded Rationality?," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 34(2), pages 669-700, June.
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