The value of information: The case of signal-dependent opportunity sets
AbstractWe generalize the economic decision problem considered by Blackwell(1953) in which a decision maker chooses an action after observing a signal correlated to the state of nature. Unlike Blackwell's case where the feasible set is fixed, in our framework, the feasible set of actions depends on the signal and the information system. As we indicate such a framework has more significance to economic models.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control.
Volume (Year): 21 (1997)
Issue (Month): 10 (August)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jedc
Other versions of this item:
- Sulganik,E. & Zilcha,I., 1996. "The value of Information: the Case of Signal-Dependent Opportunity Sets," Papers 1-96, Tel Aviv.
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
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