Anxiety and Performance: An Endogenous Learning-by-doing Model
AbstractIn this article, we show that a standard economic model, the endogenous learning-by-doing model, captures several major themes from the anxiety literature in psychology. In our model, anxiety is a fully endogenous construct that can be separated naturally into its cognitive and physiological components. As such, our results are directly comparable with hypotheses and evidence from psychology. We show that anxiety can serve a motivating function, which suggests potential applications in the principal-agent literature.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy in its series Working Papers with number 2005-01.
Date of creation: 2005
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in International Economic Review, 2006
Contact details of provider:
Postal: 1309 East Tenth Street, Room 451, Bloomington, IN 47405-1701
Web page: http://www.bus.indiana.edu/bepp/
More information through EDIRC
Diamond Paradox; price dispersion; search; strategic complementarities;
Other versions of this item:
- Michael T. Rauh & Giulio Seccia, 2006. "Anxiety And Performance: An Endogenous Learning-By-Doing Model," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 47(2), pages 583-609, 05.
- L0 - Industrial Organization - - General
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Mirman, L.J. & Samuelson, L. & Urbano, A., 1989.
8-89-7, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
- Sanford J Grossman & Oliver D Hart, 2001.
"An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
391749000000000339, David K. Levine.
- Sanford Grossman & Oliver Hart, . "An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 15-80, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
- Grossman, Sanford J & Kihlstrom, Richard E & Mirman, Leonard J, 1977. "A Bayesian Approach to the Production of Information and Learning by Doing," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(3), pages 533-47, October.
- Prescott, Edward C, 1972. "The Multi-Period Control Problem Under Uncertainty," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 40(6), pages 1043-58, November.
- Loewenstein, George, 1987. "Anticipation and the Valuation of Delayed Consumption," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 97(387), pages 666-84, September.
- Rauh, Michael T. & Seccia, Giulio, 2005. "Experimentation, full revelation, and the monotone likelihood ratio property," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 239-262, February.
- Jose Apesteguia & Ignacio Palacios-Huerta, 2010.
"Psychological Pressure in Competitive Environments: Evidence from a Randomized Natural Experiment,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 100(5), pages 2548-64, December.
- Jose Apesteguia & Ignacio Palacios-Huerta, 2008. "Psychological pressure in competitive environments: Evidence from a randomized natural experiment," Economics Working Papers 1116, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- José Apesteguia & Ignacio Palacios-Huerta, 2008. "Psychological Pressure in Competitive Environments: Evidence from a Randomized Natural Experiment," Working Papers 361, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
- Rick Harbaugh, 2005. "Prospect Theory or Skill Signaling?," Working Papers 2005-06, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
- Michael T. Rauh & Giulio Seccia, 2005. "Incentives, Monitoring, and Motivation," Game Theory and Information 0506008, EconWPA.
- Michael T. Rauh & Giulio Seccia, 2010.
"Agency and Anxiety,"
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 19(1), pages 87-116, 03.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Rick Harbaugh).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.