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The Value Of Public Information In A Cournot Duopoly

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Author Info
Ezra Einy ()
Diego Moreno ()
Benyamin Shitovitz ()

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Abstract

We derive alternative sufficient conditions for the value of public information to be either positive or negative in a Cournot duopoly where firms technology exhibits constant returns to scale.

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Paper provided by Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía in its series Economics Working Papers with number we024617.

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Date of creation: Mar 2002
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Handle: RePEc:cte:werepe:we024617

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  1. Novshek, William, 1985. "On the Existence of Cournot Equilibrium," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 52(1), pages 85-98, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Einy, Ezra & Moreno, Diego & Shitovitz, Benyamin, 2002. "Information Advantage in Cournot Oligopoly," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 106(1), pages 151-160, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Vives, Xavier, 1984. "Duopoly information equilibrium: Cournot and bertrand," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 71-94, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Gal-Or, Esther, 1985. "Information Sharing in Oligopoly," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(2), pages 329-43, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Marco Ottaviani & Andrea Prat, 2001. "The Value of Public Information in Monopoly," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(6), pages 1673-1683, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Amir, Rabah, 1996. "Cournot Oligopoly and the Theory of Supermodular Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 132-148, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Edward E. Schlee, 2001. "The Value of Information in Efficient Risk-Sharing Arrangements," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 509-524, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Sakai, Yasuhiro, 1985. "The value of information in a simple duopoly model," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 36-54, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Robert Wilson, 1975. "Informational Economies of Scale," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 6(1), pages 184-195, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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