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The Value of Public Information in Monopoly

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Author Info
Marco Ottaviani
Andrea Prat

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Article provided by Econometric Society in its journal Econometrica.

Volume (Year): 69 (2001)
Issue (Month): 6 (November)
Pages: 1673-1683
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Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:69:y:2001:i:6:p:1673-1683

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Myerson, Roger B, 1983. "Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(6), pages 1767-97, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Armstrong, Mark, 1996. "Multiproduct Nonlinear Pricing," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(1), pages 51-75, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Eric Maskin & John Riley, 1984. "Monopoly with Incomplete Information," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(2), pages 171-196, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Bikhchandani, Sushil & Hirshleifer, David & Welch, Ivo, 1992. "A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and Cultural Change in Informational Cascades," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(5), pages 992-1026, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Lewis, Tracy R & Sappington, David E M, 1994. "Supplying Information to Facilitate Price Discrimination," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 35(2), pages 309-27, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Giuseppe Moscarini & Marco Ottaviani, 1998. "Price Competition for an Informed Buyer," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1199, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Roger B. Myerson, 1978. "Optimal Auction Design," Discussion Papers 362, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  8. Maskin, Eric & Tirole, Jean, 1990. "The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(2), pages 379-409, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Banerjee, Abhijit V, 1992. "A Simple Model of Herd Behavior," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 107(3), pages 797-817, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Cremer, Jacques & McLean, Richard P, 1985. "Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist When Demands Are Interdependent," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(2), pages 345-61, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Motty Perry & Philip J. Reny, 1999. "On The Failure of the Linkage Principle in Multi-Unit Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(4), pages 895-900, July.
  12. McAfee, R Preston & Reny, Philip J, 1992. "Correlated Information and Mechanism Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(2), pages 395-421, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Akerlof, George A, 1970. "The Market for 'Lemons': Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Judd, K.L. & Riordan, M.H., 1989. "Price And Quality In A New Product Monopoly," Papers e-89-8, Stanford - Hoover Institution.
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  15. Mussa, Michael & Rosen, Sherwin, 1978. "Monopoly and product quality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 301-317, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Paul R. Milgrom, 1981. "Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 12(2), pages 380-391, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  17. Manelli, Alejandro M & Vincent, Daniel R, 1995. "Optimal Procurement Mechanisms," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(3), pages 591-620, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Maskin, Eric & Tirole, Jean, 1992. "The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(1), pages 1-42, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1089-1122, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Vasiliki Skreta, 2007. "On the Informed Seller Problem: Optimal Information Disclosure," Levine's Bibliography 843644000000000222, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. David Gill & Daniel Sgroi, 2005. "Sequential Decisions with Tests," Economics Series Working Papers 242, University of Oxford, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Peter Eso & Balazs Szentes, 2003. "The One Who Controls the Information Appropriates Its Rents," Discussion Papers 1369, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  4. Marco Ottaviani & Peter Norman Sorensen, 2002. "Professional Advice: The Theory of Reputational Cheap Talk," Discussion Papers 02-05, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  5. Vasiliki Skreta, 2008. "On the Informed Seller Problem: Optimal Information Disclosure," Working Papers 08-10, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  6. Ezra Einy & Diego Moreno & Benyamin Shitovitz, 2002. "The Value Of Public Information In A Cournot Duopoly," Economics Working Papers we024617, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Vasiliki Skreta, 2007. "On the Informed Seller Problem: Optimal Information Disclosure," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001789, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  8. Ángel Hernando Veciana & Michael Tröge, 2005. "The Insider'S Curse," Working Papers. Serie AD 2005-08, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Subir Bose & Gerhard Orosel & Marco Ottaviani & Lise Vesterlund, 2008. "Monopoly pricing in the binary herding model," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 37(2), pages 203-241, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Justin P. Johnson & David P. Myatt, 2006. "On the Simple Economics of Advertising, Marketing, and Product Design," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(3), pages 756-784, June. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  11. Gill, David & Sgroi, Daniel, 2008. "The Optimal Choice of Pre-launch Reviewer : How Best to Transmit Information using Tests and Conditional Pricing," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 877, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  12. Masaki Aoyagi, 2005. "Optimal Sales Schemes against Interdependent Buyers," ISER Discussion Paper 0645, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University. [Downloadable!]
  13. Alexander Saak, 2007. "A note on the value of public information in monopoly," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 33(2), pages 369-379, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Grigorieva, Elena & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Müller, Rudolf & Vermeulen, Dries, 2006. "The family of c-bisection auctions: efficiency and running time," Research Memoranda 019, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
  15. Rolf Tisljar, 2002. "Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal - Pure-Strategy Equilibria for a Common Value Model," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse21_2002, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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