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Secure protocols or how communication generates correlation

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  • GOSSNER, Olivier

    ()
    (Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), Université catholique de Louvain (UCL), Louvain la Neuve, Belgium)

Abstract

Correlated equilibria and communication equilibria are useful notions to understand the strategic effects of information and communication. Between these two models, a protocol generates information through communication. We define a secure protocol as a protocol from which no individual may have strategic incentives to deviate and characterize these protocols.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers with number 1997092.

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Date of creation: 01 Dec 1997
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Handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:1997092

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Related research

Keywords: Information structure; communication mechanism; correlated equilibrium; commu- nication equilibrium; protocol;

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References

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  1. repec:fth:louvco:9791 is not listed on IDEAS
  2. Forges, F., 1987. "Universal mechanisms," CORE Discussion Papers 1987004, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  3. Lehrer, Ehud & Sorin, Sylvain, 1997. "One-Shot Public Mediated Talk," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 131-148, August.
  4. Joseph Farrell, 1987. "Cheap Talk, Coordination, and Entry," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(1), pages 34-39, Spring.
  5. Forges, F., 1984. "An approach to communication equilibria," CORE Discussion Papers 1984035, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  6. Olivier Gossner, 1996. "Comparison of information structures," Economics Working Papers 169, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  7. R. Aumann, 2010. "Subjectivity and Correlation in Randomized Strategies," Levine's Working Paper Archive 389, David K. Levine.
  8. Ehud Lehrer, 1988. "Internal Correlation in Repeated Games," Discussion Papers 800, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  9. Lehrer, Ehud, 1996. "Mediated Talk," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 25(2), pages 177-88.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Hannu Vartiainen, 2009. "A Simple Model of Secure Public Communication," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 67(1), pages 101-122, July.
  2. Renault, Jérôme & Tomala, Tristan, 2004. "Learning the state of nature in repeated games with incomplete information and signals," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/6115, Paris Dauphine University.
  3. Peter Vida, 2005. "A Detail-free Mediator and the 3 Player Case," IEHAS Discussion Papers 0511, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
  4. Kar, Anirban & Ray, Indrajit & Serrano, Roberto, 2010. "A difficulty in implementing correlated equilibrium distributions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 189-193, May.
  5. Gossner, Olivier, 2000. "Comparison of Information Structures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 44-63, January.
  6. Ehud Lehrer & Dinah Rosenberg, 2003. "Information and Its Value in Zero-Sum Repeated Games," Game Theory and Information 0312003, EconWPA.
  7. Heller, Yuval, 2010. "Minority-proof cheap-talk protocol," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 394-400, July.
  8. Adam Tauman Kalai & Ehud Kalai & Dov Samet, 2007. "Voluntary Commitments Lead to Efficiency," Discussion Papers 1444, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  9. Anirban Kar, Indrajit Ray and Robedrto Serrano, 2005. "Multiple Equilibria as a Difficulty in Understanding Correlated Distributions," Discussion Papers 05-18, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
  10. Vida, Péter & Azacis, Helmuts, 2012. "A Detail-Free Mediator," Cardiff Economics Working Papers E2012/10, Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section.
  11. Gossner, Olivier & Vieille, Nicolas, 2001. "Repeated Communication Through the Mechanism And," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/6031, Paris Dauphine University.
  12. Kalai, Adam Tauman & Kalai, Ehud & Lehrer, Ehud & Samet, Dov, 2010. "A commitment folk theorem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 127-137, May.
  13. Ehud Lehrer & Dinah Rosenberg, 2003. "What restrictions do Bayesian games impose on the value of information?," Game Theory and Information 0312005, EconWPA.
  14. GOSSNER , Olivier & VIEILLE, Nicolas, 1998. "Repeated communication through the mechanism “and”," CORE Discussion Papers 1998056, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  15. Indrajit Ray, 2002. "Multiple Equilibrium Problem and Non-Canonical Correlation Devices," Working Papers 2002-24, Brown University, Department of Economics.

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