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Implementation of communication equilibria by correlated cheap talk: The two-player case

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Author Info

  • Forges, Françoise

    ()
    (CEREMADE and LEDa, Universite Paris-Dauphine and Institut Universitaire de France)

  • Vida, Péter

    ()
    (Department of Economics, University of Mannheim)

Abstract

We show that essentially every communication equilibrium of any finite Bayesian game with two players can be implemented as a strategic form correlated equilibrium of an extended game, in which before choosing actions as in the Bayesian game, the players engage in a possibly infinitely long (but in equilibrium almost surely finite), direct, cheap talk.

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File URL: http://econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/article/viewFile/20130095/8132/249
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Econometric Society in its journal Theoretical Economics.

Volume (Year): 8 (2013)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages:

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Handle: RePEc:the:publsh:944

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Web page: http://econtheory.org

Related research

Keywords: Bayesian game; cheap talk; communication equilibrium; correlated equilibrium; pre-play communication;

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References

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  2. Forges, Francoise, 1988. "Can sunspots replace a mediator?," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 347-368, September.
  3. Koessler, Frédéric & Forges, Françoise, 2008. "Multistage communication with and without verifiable types," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/1121, Paris Dauphine University.
  4. Vida, Péter & Azacis, Helmuts, 2012. "A Detail-Free Mediator," Cardiff Economics Working Papers E2012/10, Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Chirantan Ganguly & Indrajit Ray, 2009. "Simple Mediation in a Cheap-Talk Game," Discussion Papers 05-08r, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
  2. Vida, Péter & Azacis, Helmuts, 2012. "A Detail-Free Mediator," Cardiff Economics Working Papers E2012/10, Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section.
  3. Peters, Michael & Troncoso-Valverde, Cristian, 2010. "A Folk Theorem for Competing Mechanisms," Microeconomics.ca working papers michael_peters-2010-17, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 19 Oct 2013.
  4. Laruelle, Annick & Iñarra García, María Elena & Zuazo Garín, Peio, 2012. "Games with perceptions," IKERLANAK Ikerlanak;2012-64, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I.

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