A folk theorem for competing mechanisms
AbstractWe provide a partial characterization of the set of outcome functions that can be supported as perfect Bayesian equilibrium in the recommendation game described in [T. Yamashita, Mechanism games with multiple principals and three or more agents, Econometrica 78 (2) (2010) 791–801]. We show that the set of outcome functions that can be supported is at least as large as the set supportable by a mechanism designer in the sense of Myerson (Myerson, 1979 ). We show how to support random and correlated outcomes as equilibrium outcomes in the recommendation game.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.
Volume (Year): 148 (2013)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869
Competing mechanisms; Collusion; Implementable;
Other versions of this item:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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- James Albrecht, Pieter Gautier, Susan Vroman, 2013. "Efficient Entry in Competing Auctions," Working Papers gueconwpa~13-13-05, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
- Seungjin Han, 2012.
"Implicit Collusion in Non-Exclusive Contracting under Adverse Selection,"
Department of Economics Working Papers
2012-15, McMaster University, revised Apr 2013.
- Han, Seungjin, 2011. "Implicit Collusion in Non-Exclusive Contracting under Adverse Selection," Micro Theory Working Papers seungjin_han-2011-10, Microeconomics.ca Website, revised 02 Apr 2013.
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