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A Revelation Principle for Competing Mechanisms

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Author Info
Epstein, Larry G.
Peters, Michael

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WJ3-45FKNY8-12/2/d4e4c5a4255ad345c61754fa99773636
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 88 (1999)
Issue (Month): 1 (September)
Pages: 119-160
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Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:88:y:1999:i:1:p:119-160

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. spyros vassilakis, 2002. "rules for changing the rules," Game Theory and Information 0211006, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Harsanyi, John C, 1995. "Games with Incomplete Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(3), pages 291-303, June.
  3. Peters, Michael, 1997. "A Competitive Distribution of Auctions," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 64(1), pages 97-123, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Wilson, Robert B, 1985. "Incentive Efficiency of Double Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(5), pages 1101-15, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Brandenburger Adam & Dekel Eddie, 1993. "Hierarchies of Beliefs and Common Knowledge," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 189-198, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Vassilakis, Spyros, 1992. "Some economic applications of Scott domains," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 24(2-3), pages 173-208, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. Schmeidler, David, 1989. "Subjective Probability and Expected Utility without Additivity," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(3), pages 571-87, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. McAfee, R Preston, 1993. "Mechanism Design by Competing Sellers," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(6), pages 1281-1312, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  1. Han, Seungjin, 2006. "Strongly Robust Equilibrium and Competing-Mechanism Games," Micro Theory Working Papers han-06-01-19-06-37-40, Microeconomics.ca Website, revised 23 Feb 2007. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. John Kennes, 2004. "Competitive Auctions: Theory and Application," CAM Working Papers 2004-17, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Applied Microeconometrics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Larry G. Epstein & Alvaro Sandroni, 2003. "Non-Bayesian Updating : A Theoretical Framework," RCER Working Papers 505, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Michael Peters, 1997. "Surplus Extraction and Competition," Working Papers peters-97-02, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Ángel Hernando Veciana, 2001. "Competition Among Auctioneers," Working Papers. Serie AD 2001-18, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie). [Downloadable!]
  6. Giacomo Calzolari & Alessandro Pavan, 2004. "On the Optimality of Privacy in Sequential Contracting," Discussion Papers 1394, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Michael Peters, 2000. "Negotiation and Take it or Leave it in Common Agency," Working Papers peters-00-02, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. David Martimort & Lars Stole, 2003. "Contractual Externalities and Common Agency Equilibria," Advances in Theoretical Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 3(1), pages 1037-1037. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Cecile Aubert & Jerome Pouyet, 2000. "Collusion Under Asymmetric Information and Institutional Incompleteness," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0806, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  10. Reich, S., 2007. "Robust Incentives," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0729, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge. [Downloadable!]
  11. Adam Tauman Kalai & Ehud Kalai & Dov Samet, 2007. "Voluntary Commitments Lead to Efficiency," Discussion Papers 1444, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  12. David Martimort & Lars Stole, 2001. "Contractual Externalities and Common Agency Equilibria," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
  13. Han, Seungjin, 2004. "Menu Theorems for Bilateral Contracting," Micro Theory Working Papers han-04-01-29-10-05-13, Microeconomics.ca Website, revised 29 Jan 2004. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  14. Xiaodong Wu, 2000. ""Pollution Havens" and the Regulation of Multinationals by Multiple Governments," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1766, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  15. Michael Peters, 1999. "Common Agency and the Revelation Principle," Working Papers peters-99-01, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  16. Hisashi Nakamura, 2007. "Strategic Default Jump as Impulse Control in Continuous Time," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-532, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. [Downloadable!]
  17. MARTIMORT, David & STOLE, Lars, 1999. "Contractual Externalities and Common Agency Equilibria," IDEI Working Papers 110, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised 2003. [Downloadable!]
  18. David Martimort & Humberto Luiz Ataide Moreira, 2004. "Common agency with informed principals," Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 551, Graduate School of Economics, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil). [Downloadable!]
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