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Abstract

In modelling competition among mechanism designers, it is necessary to specify the set of feasible mechanisms. These specifications are often borrowed from the optimal mechanism design literature and exclude mechanisms that are natural in a competitive environment; for example, mechanisms that depend on the mechanisms chosen by competitors. This paper constructs a set of mechanisms that is universal in that any specific model of the feasible set can be embedded in it. An equilibrium for a specific model is robust if and only if it is an equilibrium also for the universal set of mechanisms. A key to the construction is a language for describing mechanisms that is not tied to any preconceived notions of the nature of competition.

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File URL: http://www.economics.utoronto.ca/public/workingPapers/UT-ECIPA-PETERS-96-02.ps
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Toronto, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number peters-96-02.

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Length: 54 pages
Date of creation: 09 Dec 1996
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:tor:tecipa:peters-96-02

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Find related papers by JEL classification:

• C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
• D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

References

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1. Peters, Michael & Severinov, Sergei, 1997. "Competition among Sellers Who Offer Auctions Instead of Prices," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 141-179, July.
   
   • Michael Peters & Sergei Severinov, 1995. "Competition Among Sellers who offer Auctions Instead of Prices," Working Papers peters-95-02, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
2. Vassilakis, S., 1991. "Rules for Changing the Rules," Papers 32, Stanford - Institute for Thoretical Economics.
   
   • spyros vassilakis, 2002. "rules for changing the rules," Game Theory and Information 0211006, EconWPA.
3. Harsanyi, John C., 1994. "Games with Incomplete Information," Nobel Prize in Economics documents 1994-1, Nobel Prize Committee.
   
   • Harsanyi, John C, 1995. "Games with Incomplete Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(3), pages 291-303, June.
4. Peters, Michael, 1997. "A Competitive Distribution of Auctions," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 64(1), pages 97-123, January.
   
   • Michael Peters, 1995. "A Competitive Distribution of Auctions," Working Papers peters-95-03, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
5. Vassilakis, Spyros, 1992. "Some economic applications of Scott domains," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 24(2-3), pages 173-208, November.
   
   • spyros vassilakis, 2002. "some economic applications of scott domains," Game Theory and Information 0207002, EconWPA.
6. Schmeidler, David, 1989. "Subjective Probability and Expected Utility without Additivity," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(3), pages 571-87, May.
   
   • David Schmeidler, 1989. "Subjective Probability and Expected Utility without Additivity," Levine's Working Paper Archive 7662, David K. Levine.
7. Wilson, Robert, 1979. "Auctions of Shares," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 93(4), pages 675-89, November.
8. Brandenburger Adam & Dekel Eddie, 1993. "Hierarchies of Beliefs and Common Knowledge," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 189-198, February.
9. Michael L. Katz., 1991. "Game-Playing Agents: Unobservable Contracts as Precommitments," Economics Working Papers 91-172, University of California at Berkeley.
   
   • Michael L. Katz, 1991. "Game-Playing Agents: Unobservable Contracts as Precommitments," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(3), pages 307-328, Autumn.
   • Katz, Michael L., 1991. "Game-Playing Agents: Unobservable Contracts as Precommitments," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt79b870w0, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
10. Dan Bernhardt & Eric Hughson, 1993. "Splitting Orders," Working Papers 888, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
    
    • Bernhardt, Dan & Hughson, Eric, 1997. "Splitting Orders," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 10(1), pages 69-101.
11. Wilson, Robert B, 1985. "Incentive Efficiency of Double Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(5), pages 1101-15, September.
12. McAfee, R Preston, 1993. "Mechanism Design by Competing Sellers," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(6), pages 1281-1312, November.
13. Kyle, Albert S, 1985. "Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(6), pages 1315-35, November.
14. Myerson, Roger B., 1982. "Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 67-81, June.

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