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A Revelation Principle For Competing Mechanisms

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Author Info
Larry Epstein
Michael Peters

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Abstract

In modelling competition among mechanism designers, it is necessary to specify the set of feasible mechanisms. These specifications are often borrowed from the optimal mechanism design literature and exclude mechanisms that are natural in a competitive environment; for example, mechanisms that depend on the mechanisms chosen by competitors. This paper constructs a set of mechanisms that is universal in that any specific model of the feasible set can be embedded in it. An equilibrium for a specific model is robust if and only if it is an equilibrium also for the universal set of mechanisms. A key to the construction is a language for describing mechanisms that is not tied to any preconceived notions of the nature of competition.

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File URL: http://repec.economics.utoronto.ca/files/UT-ECIPA-PETERS-96-02.ps
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Toronto, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number peters-96-02.

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Length: 54 pages
Date of creation: 09 Dec 1996
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:tor:tecipa:peters-96-02

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information

References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Wilson, Robert B, 1985. "Incentive Efficiency of Double Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(5), pages 1101-15, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. McAfee, R Preston, 1993. "Mechanism Design by Competing Sellers," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(6), pages 1281-1312, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. spyros vassilakis, 2002. "rules for changing the rules," Game Theory and Information 0211006, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Harsanyi, John C, 1995. "Games with Incomplete Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(3), pages 291-303, June.
    Other versions:
  5. Peters, Michael, 1997. "A Competitive Distribution of Auctions," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 64(1), pages 97-123, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Vassilakis, Spyros, 1992. "Some economic applications of Scott domains," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 24(2-3), pages 173-208, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. Schmeidler, David, 1989. "Subjective Probability and Expected Utility without Additivity," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(3), pages 571-87, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Brandenburger Adam & Dekel Eddie, 1993. "Hierarchies of Beliefs and Common Knowledge," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 189-198, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. repec:bep:theadv:v:3:y:2003:i:1:p:1037-1037 is not listed on IDEAS
  2. John Kennes, 2004. "Competitive Auctions: Theory and Application," Discussion Papers 04-16, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Reich, S., 2007. "Robust Incentives," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0729, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge. [Downloadable!]
  4. Giacomo Calzolari & Alessandro Pavan, 2004. "On the Optimality of Privacy in Sequential Contracting," Discussion Papers 1394, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Martimort, David & Stole, Lars, 1999. "Contractual Externalities and Common Agency Equilibria," IDEI Working Papers 110, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised 2003. [Downloadable!]
  6. Michael Peters, 1997. "Surplus Extraction and Competition," Working Papers peters-97-02, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Ángel Hernando Veciana, 2001. "Competition Among Auctioneers," Working Papers. Serie AD 2001-18, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie). [Downloadable!]
  8. Cecile Aubert & Jerome Pouyet, 2000. "Collusion Under Asymmetric Information and Institutional Incompleteness," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0806, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  9. Xiaodong Wu, 2000. ""Pollution Havens" and the Regulation of Multinationals by Multiple Governments," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1766, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  10. Martimort, David & Moreira, Humberto Luiz Ataide, 2004. "Common agency with informed principals," Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 551, Graduate School of Economics, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil). [Downloadable!]
  11. Larry G. Epstein & Alvaro Sandroni, 2003. "Non-Bayesian Updating : A Theoretical Framework," RCER Working Papers 505, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  12. Han, Seungjin, 2004. "Menu Theorems for Bilateral Contracting," Micro Theory Working Papers han-04-01-29-10-05-13, Microeconomics.ca Website, revised 29 Jan 2004. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  13. Adam Tauman Kalai & Ehud Kalai & Dov Samet, 2007. "Voluntary Commitments Lead to Efficiency," Discussion Papers 1444, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  14. Han, Seungjin, 2006. "Strongly Robust Equilibrium and Competing-Mechanism Games," Micro Theory Working Papers han-06-01-19-06-37-40, Microeconomics.ca Website, revised 23 Feb 2007. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  15. Udo Schmidt-Mohr & J. Villas-Boas, 2008. "Competitive product lines with quality constraints," Quantitative Marketing and Economics, Springer, vol. 6(1), pages 1-16, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Michael Peters, 1999. "Common Agency and the Revelation Principle," Working Papers peters-99-01, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  17. Hisashi Nakamura, 2007. "Strategic Default Jump as Impulse Control in Continuous Time," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-532, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. [Downloadable!]
  18. Michael Peters, 2000. "Negotiation and Take it or Leave it in Common Agency," Working Papers peters-00-02, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  19. David Martimort & Lars Stole, 2001. "Contractual Externalities and Common Agency Equilibria," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
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