rules for changing the rules
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 0211006.
Length: 70 pages
Date of creation: 12 Nov 2002
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Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 70; figures: included
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game theory; infinite regress; category theory; endogenous rules.;
Other versions of this item:
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- D00 - Microeconomics - - General - - - General
- L00 - Industrial Organization - - General - - - General
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- spyros vassilakis, 2002.
"some economic applications of scott domains,"
Game Theory and Information
- Larry Epstein & Michael Peters, 1996.
"A Revelation Principle For Competing Mechanisms,"
peters-96-02, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
- Roger Lagunoff, 1995.
"On the dynamic selection of mechanisms for provisions of public projects,"
Discussion Paper / Institute for Empirical Macroeconomics
100, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
- Lagunoff, Roger, 1997. "On the dynamic selection of mechanisms for provision of public projects," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 21(10), pages 1699-1725, August.
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