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some economic applications of scott domains

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  • spyros vassilakis

Abstract

The present paper is structured around two main constructions, fixed points of functors and fibrations and sections of functors. Fixed points of functors are utilized to resolve problems of infinite regress that have recently appeared in economics. Fibrations and sections are utilized to model solution concepts abstractly, so that we can solve equations whose arguments are solution concepts. Most of the objects (games, solution concepts) that we consider can be obtained as some kind of limit of their finite subobjects. Some of the constructions preserve computability. The paper relies heavily on recent work on the semantics of program- ming languages.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 0207002.

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Date of creation: 12 Jul 2002
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Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0207002

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Keywords: scott domains; infinite regress; game theory;

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  1. Lewis, Alain A., 1992. "On turing degrees of Walrasian models and a general impossibility result in the theory of decision-making," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 24(2-3), pages 141-171, November.
  2. spyros vassilakis, 2002. "some economic applications of scott domains," Game Theory and Information 0207002, EconWPA.
  3. Vassilakis, S., 1991. "Rules for Changing the Rules," Papers 32, Stanford - Institute for Thoretical Economics.
  4. Crawford, Vincent P, 1985. "Efficient and Durable Decision Rules: A Reformulation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(4), pages 817-35, July.
  5. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1990. "Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(6), pages 1255-77, November.
  6. Lipman, Barton L, 1991. "How to Decide How to Decide How to. . . : Modeling Limited Rationality," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(4), pages 1105-25, July.
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Cited by:
  1. Larry Epstein & Michael Peters, 1996. "A Revelation Principle For Competing Mechanisms," Working Papers peters-96-02, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
  2. Vassilakis, Spyros, 1992. "Some economic applications of Scott domains," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 24(2-3), pages 173-208, November.

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