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A Unified Approach to Information, Knowledge, and Stability Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Xiao Luo
Yi-Chun Chen
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Within the context of strategic interaction, we provide a unified framework for analyzing information, knowledge, and the "stable" pattern of behavior. We first study the related interactive epistemology and, in particular, show an equivalence theorem between a strictly dominated strategy and a never-best reply in terms of epistemic states. We then explore epistemic foundations behind the fascinating idea of stability due to J. von Neumann and O. Morgenstern. The major features of our approach are: (i)unlike the ad hoc semantic model of knowledge, the state space is constructed by Harsanyi’s types that are explicitly formulated by Epstein and Wang (Econometrica 64, 1996, 1343-1373); (ii)players may have general preferences, including subjective expected utility and non-expected utility; and (iii) players may be boundedly rational and have non-partitional information structures
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Paper provided by Econometric Society in its series Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings with number
472.
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Date of creation: 11 Aug 2004Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ecm:feam04:472Contact details of provider: Phone: 1 212 998 3820 Fax: 1 212 995 4487 Email: Web page: http://www.econometricsociety.org/pastmeetings.asp More information through EDIRC
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Keywords: epistemic games ; Harsanyi's types ; interactive epistemology ; stability ; non-expected utility ; bounded rationality ; Find related papers by JEL classification: C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
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references Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Yi-Chun Chen & Ngo Van Long & Xiao Luo, 2007.
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