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Extensive Form Games with Uncertainty Averse Players

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Kin Chung Lo

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Abstract

Existing equilibrium concepts for games make use of the subjective expected utility model axiomatized by Savage (1954) to represent players' preferences. Accordingly, each player's beliefs about the strategies played by opponents are represented by a probability measure. Motivated by the Ellsberg Paradox and relevant experimental findings demonstrating that the beliefs of a decision maker may not be representable by a probability measure, this paper generalizes Nash Equilibrium in finite extensive form games to allow for preferences conforming to the multiple priors model developed in Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). The implications of this generalization for strategy choices and welfare are studied.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Toronto, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number ecpap-95-03.

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Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: 09 Jul 1995
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Handle: RePEc:tor:tecipa:ecpap-95-03

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Gilboa Itzhak & Schmeidler David, 1993. "Updating Ambiguous Beliefs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 33-49, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 1994. "A Course in Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262650401, January.
    Other versions:
  3. Kin Chung Lo, 1995. "Nash Equilibrium without Mutual Knowledge of Rationality," Working Papers ecpap-95-04, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. Epstein Larry G. & Le Breton Michel, 1993. "Dynamically Consistent Beliefs Must Be Bayesian," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 1-22, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Gilboa, Itzhak & Schmeidler, David, 1989. "Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 141-153, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Machina, Mark J & Schmeidler, David, 1992. "A More Robust Definition of Subjective Probability," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(4), pages 745-80, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Schmeidler, David, 1989. "Subjective Probability and Expected Utility without Additivity," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(3), pages 571-87, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Machina, Mark J, 1989. "Dynamic Consistency and Non-expected Utility Models of Choice under Uncertainty," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 27(4), pages 1622-68, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Karni, E. & Safra, Z., 1988. "Ascending Bid Auctions With Behaviorally Consistent Bidders," Papers 1-88, Tel Aviv.
  10. Kohlberg, Elon & Mertens, Jean-Francois, 1986. "On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(5), pages 1003-37, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Jorn Rothe, 2000. "Uncertainty Aversion and Backward Induction," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1610, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  2. De Waegenaere, A. & Wakker, P., 1997. "Choquet integrals with respect to non-monotonic set functions," Discussion Paper 44, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  3. Takao Asano, 2004. "Portfolio Inertia under Ambiguity," ISER Discussion Paper 0609, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University. [Downloadable!]
  4. Werlang, Sérgio Ribeiro da Costa, 2000. "A Notion Of Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium Under Knightian Uncertainty," Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 376, Graduate School of Economics, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil). [Downloadable!]
  5. Eichberger, Jürgen & Kelsey, David, 2003. "Sequential Two-Player Games with Ambiguity," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 03-27, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. David Dequech, 2006. "Towards An Alternative To The Game-Theoretic Concept Of Conventions," Anais do XXXIV Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 34th Brazilian Economics Meeting] 77, ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pósgraduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics].
  7. Nicola Dimitri, 2005. "Cooperation with Strategy-Dependent Uncertainty Attitude," Department of Economics University of Siena 457, Department of Economics, University of Siena. [Downloadable!]
  8. Takao Asano, 2004. "Portfolio Inertia and [Epsilon]-Contaminations," ISER Discussion Paper 0610, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University. [Downloadable!]
  9. Xiao Luo & Yi-Chun Chen, 2004. "A Unified Approach to Information, Knowledge, and Stability," Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings 472, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
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