Existing equilibrium concepts for games make use of the subjective expected utility model axiomatized by Savage (1954) to represent players' preferences. Accordingly, each player's beliefs about the strategies played by opponents are represented by a probability measure. Motivated by the Ellsberg Paradox and relevant experimental findings demonstrating that the beliefs of a decision maker may not be representable by a probability measure, this paper generalizes Nash Equilibrium in finite extensive form games to allow for preferences conforming to the multiple priors model developed in Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). The implications of this generalization for strategy choices and welfare are studied.
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Paper provided by University of Toronto, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number
ecpap-95-03.
Find related papers by JEL classification: C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Itzhak Gilboa & David Schmeidler, 1991.
"Updating Ambiguous Beliefs,"
Discussion Papers
924, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 1994.
"A Course in Game Theory,"
MIT Press Books,
The MIT Press,
edition 1, volume 1, number 0262650401, January.
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Cited by: (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Jürgen Eichberger & David Kelsey, 2004.
"Sequential Two-Player Games With Ambiguity,"
International Economic Review,
Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 45(4), pages 1229-1261, November.
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