Uncertainty aversion and equilibrium existence in games with incomplete information
AbstractWe consider games with incomplete information à la Harsanyi, where the payoff of a player depends on an unknown state of nature as well as on the profile of chosen actions. As opposed to the standard model, playersʼ preferences over state-contingent utility vectors are represented by arbitrary functionals. The definitions of Nash and Bayes equilibria naturally extend to this generalized setting. We characterize equilibrium existence in terms of the preferences of the participating players. It turns out that, given continuity and monotonicity of the preferences, equilibrium exists in every game if and only if all players are averse to uncertainty (i.e., all the functionals are quasi-concave).
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.
Volume (Year): 73 (2011)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836
Games with incomplete information; Equilibrium existence; Uncertainty aversion; Convex preferences;
Other versions of this item:
- Azrieli, Yaron & Teper, Roee, 2009. "Uncertainty aversion and equilibrium existence in games with incomplete information," MPRA Paper 17617, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
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