Dynamically Stable Preferences
AbstractIn the framework of dynamic choice under uncertainty, we define dynamic stability as a combination of two assumptions prevalent in the literature: dynamic consistency and the requirement that updated preferences belong to the same class as ex ante ones. Maxmin preferences are shown to be not dynamically stable, and any dynamically stable subset in that class can contain only expected utility preferences. Dynamic stability also turns out to be a defining characteristic of the multiplier preferences of Hansen and Sargent (2001) within the scope of variational preferences. Restrictions imposed by dynamic stability are shown to be related to invariance of preferences.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Collegio Carlo Alberto in its series Carlo Alberto Notebooks with number 263.
Length: 40 pages
Date of creation: 2012
Date of revision:
dynamic consistency; dynamic stability; ambiguity; invariance; consequentialism; Sure Thing Principle; multiplier preferences;
Other versions of this item:
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-09-22 (All new papers)
- NEP-EVO-2012-09-22 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2012-09-22 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-UPT-2012-09-22 (Utility Models & Prospect Theory)
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