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Correlated Nash Equilibrium

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Author Info
Kin Chung Lo () (Department of Economics, York University)

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Abstract

Nash equilibrium presumes that players have expected utility preferences, and therefore the beliefs of each player are represented by a probability measure. Motivated by Ellsberg-type behavior, which contradicts the probabilistic representation of beliefs, we generalize Nash equilibrium in n-player strategic games to allow for preferences conforming to the maxmin expected utility model of Gilboa and Schmeidler [Journal of Mathematical Economics, 18 (1989), 141–153]. With no strings attached, our equilibrium concept can be characterized by the suitably modified epistemic conditions for Nash equilibrium.

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File URL: http://dept.econ.yorku.ca/research/workingPapers/working_papers/2007/CorrelatedNashEquilibrium2007.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by York University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2007_5.

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Length: 24 pages
Date of creation: Sep 2007
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Handle: RePEc:yca:wpaper:2007_5

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Related research
Keywords: Agreeing to disagree; Correlated equilibrium; Epistemic conditions; Knightian uncertainty; Multiple priors; Nash equilibrium;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty

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  1. Lo, Kin Chung, 2000. "A note on mutually absolutely continuous belief systems," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 149-156, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-23.

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