Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Nash Equilibrium without Mutual Knowledge of Rationality

Contents:

Author Info

  • Kin Chung Lo

Abstract

This paper defines an equilibrium concept for general preferences in two person normal form games. It collapses to Nash Equilibrium when preferences are represented by the expected utility model. An important characteristic of the equilibrium concept is that player i does not necessarily know that player j is rational, but she views rationality as infinitely more likely than irrationality. For suitable models of preferences, the equilibrium concept predicts that a player will take a "cautious" strategy that is not a best response in any Nash Equilibrium.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.economics.utoronto.ca/public/workingPapers/UT-ECIPA-ECPAP-95-04.ps
File Function: MainText
Download Restriction: no

File URL: http://www.economics.utoronto.ca/public/workingPapers/UT-ECIPA-ECPAP-95-04.pdf
File Function: MainText
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Toronto, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number ecpap-95-04.

as in new window
Length: 17 pages
Date of creation: 09 Jul 1995
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:tor:tecipa:ecpap-95-04

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 150 St. George Street, Toronto, Ontario
Phone: (416) 978-5283

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. David Schmeidler, 1989. "Subjective Probability and Expected Utility without Additivity," Levine's Working Paper Archive 7662, David K. Levine.
  2. Dow James & Werlang Sergio Ribeiro Da Costa, 1994. "Nash Equilibrium under Knightian Uncertainty: Breaking Down Backward Induction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 305-324, December.
  3. Dekel, Eddie & Safra, Zvi & Segal, Uzi, 1991. "Existence and dynamic consistency of Nash equilibrium with non-expected utility preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 229-246, December.
  4. Crawford, Vincent P., 1990. "Equilibrium without independence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 127-154, February.
  5. Blume, Lawrence & Brandenburger, Adam & Dekel, Eddie, 1991. "Lexicographic Probabilities and Choice under Uncertainty," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(1), pages 61-79, January.
  6. Gilboa, Itzhak & Schmeidler, David, 1989. "Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 141-153, April.
  7. Aumann, Robert & Brandenburger, Adam, 1995. "Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(5), pages 1161-80, September.
  8. Mukerji, S., 1995. "A theory of play for games in strategic form when rationality is not common knowledge," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 9519, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
  9. Blume, Lawrence & Brandenburger, Adam & Dekel, Eddie, 1991. "Lexicographic Probabilities and Equilibrium Refinements," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(1), pages 81-98, January.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Eichberger, Jurgen & Kelsey, David, 2002. "Strategic Complements, Substitutes, and Ambiguity: The Implications for Public Goods," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 106(2), pages 436-466, October.
  2. Eichberger, Jürgen & Kelsey, David, 2008. "Are the Treasures of Game Theory Ambiguous?," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 08-08, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
  3. Lo, Kin Chung, 2005. "More likely than unlikely," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 39-53, January.
  4. Werlang, Sérgio Ribeiro da Costa, 2000. "A Notion Of Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium Under Knightian Uncertainty," Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 376, FGV/EPGE Escola Brasileira de Economia e Finanças, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil).
  5. Lo, Kin Chung, 2009. "Correlated Nash equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(2), pages 722-743, March.
  6. Kin Chung Lo, 1995. "Extensive Form Games with Uncertainty Averse Players," Working Papers ecpap-95-03, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
  7. Lo, Kin Chung, 2002. "Correlated equilibrium under uncertainty," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 183-209, November.
  8. Kin Chung Lo, 1998. "Epistemic Conditions for Agreement and Stochastic Independence of epsilon-Contaminated Beliefs," Working Papers 1998_02, York University, Department of Economics.
  9. Eichberger, Jurgen & Kelsey, David, 2000. "Non-Additive Beliefs and Strategic Equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 183-215, February.
  10. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:4:y:2006:i:37:p:1-7 is not listed on IDEAS
  11. Lo, Kin Chung, 2011. "Possibility and permissibility," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 109-113, September.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:tor:tecipa:ecpap-95-04. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (RePEc Maintainer).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.