This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

A Theory of Play for Games in Strategic Form when Rationality is not Common Knowledge

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Mukerji, S.

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Download Info
To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton in its series Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics with number 9519.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: 01 Jan 1995
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:stn:sotoec:9519

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Highfield, Southampton SO17 1BJ
Phone: (+44) 23 80592537
Fax: (+44) 23 80593858
Email:
Web page: http://www.economics.soton.ac.uk/
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Chris Thorn).

Related research
Keywords:

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Ludovic Renou & Karl H. Schlag, 2008. "Minimax regret and strategic uncertainty," Discussion Papers in Economics 08/2, Department of Economics, University of Leicester, revised Apr 2008. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Jorn Rothe, 2000. "Uncertainty Aversion and Backward Induction," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1610, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  3. Kin Chung Lo, 1998. "Epistemic Conditions for Agreement and Stochastic Independence of epsilon-Contaminated Beliefs," Working Papers 1998_02, York University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. Kin Chung Lo, 1995. "Nash Equilibrium without Mutual Knowledge of Rationality," Working Papers ecpap-95-04, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  5. Werlang, Sérgio Ribeiro da Costa, 2000. "A Notion Of Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium Under Knightian Uncertainty," Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 376, Graduate School of Economics, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil). [Downloadable!]
  6. Sujoy Mukerji & Hyun Song Shin, 2002. "Equilibrium Departures from Common Knowledge in Games with Non-Additive Expected Utility," Advances in Theoretical Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 2(1), pages 1011-1011. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? About 1000 journals are listed on RePEc.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-3.


This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.