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A Theory of Play for Games in Strategic Form when Rationality is not Common Knowledge Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Mukerji, S.
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Paper provided by Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton in its series Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics with number
9519.
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Date of creation: 01 Jan 1995Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:stn:sotoec:9519Contact details of provider: Postal: Highfield, Southampton SO17 1BJ Phone: (+44) 23 80592537 Fax: (+44) 23 80593858 Email: Web page: http://www.economics.soton.ac.uk/ More information through EDIRC
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Sujoy Mukerji & Hyun Song Shin, 2002.
"Equilibrium Departures from Common Knowledge in Games with Non-Additive Expected Utility ,"
Advances in Theoretical Economics ,
Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 2(1), pages 1011-1011.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Sérgio Ribeiro da Costa Werlang, 2000.
"A Notion Of Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium Under Knightian Uncertainty ,"
Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE)
376, Graduate School of Economics, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil).
[Downloadable!]
Ludovic Renou & Karl Schlag, 2008.
"Minimax regret and strategic uncertainty ,"
Economics Working Papers
1087, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
[Downloadable!]
Kin Chung Lo, 1998.
"Epistemic Conditions for Agreement and Stochastic Independence of epsilon-Contaminated Beliefs ,"
Working Papers
1998_02, York University, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Kin Chung Lo, 1995.
"Nash Equilibrium without Mutual Knowledge of Rationality ,"
Working Papers
ecpap-95-04, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Ludovic Renou & Karl H. Schlag, 2008.
"Minimax regret and strategic uncertainty ,"
Discussion Papers in Economics
08/2, Department of Economics, University of Leicester, revised Apr 2008.
[Downloadable!]
Jorn Rothe, 2000.
"Uncertainty Aversion and Backward Induction ,"
Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers
1610, Econometric Society.
[Downloadable!]
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