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Possibility and permissibility

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  • Kin Chung Lo

    ()
    (York University, Toronto)

Abstract

We generalize permissibility (Brandenburger, 1992) to allow for any suitably defined model of preference and definition of possibility. We also prove that the generalized solution concept characterizes rationality, caution, and “common belief" of rationality and caution.

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File URL: http://dept.econ.yorku.ca/research/workingPapers/working_papers/2009/Possibility%20and%20permissibility.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by York University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2009_01.

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Length: 15 pages
Date of creation: Sep 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:yca:wpaper:2009_01

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  1. Mukerji, S., 1995. "A theory of play for games in strategic form when rationality is not common knowledge," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 9519, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
  2. Borgers Tilman, 1994. "Weak Dominance and Approximate Common Knowledge," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 265-276, October.
  3. Machina,Mark & Schmeidler,David, 1991. "A more robust definition of subjective probability," Discussion Paper Serie A 365, University of Bonn, Germany.
  4. Epstein, Larry G., 1997. "Preference, Rationalizability and Equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 1-29, March.
  5. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:4:y:2006:i:37:p:1-7 is not listed on IDEAS
  6. Drew Fudenberg & Eddie Dekel, 1987. "Rational Behavior with Payoff Uncertainty," Working papers 471, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  7. Gilboa,Itzhak, 2009. "Theory of Decision under Uncertainty," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521741231, April.
  8. Kin Chung Lo, 1995. "Nash Equilibrium without Mutual Knowledge of Rationality," Working Papers ecpap-95-04, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
  9. Pearce, David G, 1984. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1029-50, July.
  10. Lo, Kin Chung, 2005. "More likely than unlikely," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 39-53, January.
  11. Adam Brandenburger & Amanda Friedenberg & H. Jerome Keisler, 2008. "Admissibility in Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 76(2), pages 307-352, 03.
  12. Daniel Ellsberg, 2000. "Risk, Ambiguity and the Savage Axioms," Levine's Working Paper Archive 7605, David K. Levine.
  13. Matthew J. Ryan, 2002. "What do uncertainty-averse decision-makers believe?," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 20(1), pages 47-65.
  14. D. Pearce, 2010. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection," Levine's Working Paper Archive 523, David K. Levine.
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