Possibility and permissibility
AbstractWe generalize permissibility (Brandenburger, 1992) to allow for any suitably defined model of preference and definition of possibility. We also prove that the generalized solution concept characterizes rationality, caution, and “common belief" of rationality and caution.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by York University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2009_01.
Length: 15 pages
Date of creation: Sep 2009
Date of revision:
Other versions of this item:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-09-19 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-2009-09-19 (Game Theory)
- NEP-UPT-2009-09-19 (Utility Models & Prospect Theory)
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